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Tawang: Why China gets all worked up

Srinath Raghavan

Oct.30 : The Dalai Lama's impending visit to Tawang has raised the hackles of the Chinese government, leading to yet another contretemps between Beijing and New Delhi. The Indian government has quite properly observed that the Dalai Lama is at liberty to travel to any part of the country, but that he could not undertake any political activity. Yet it is important to understand why China has reacted so sharply; for the underlying issues have bedevilled Sino-Indian relations over the past five decades.

The short answer is that from Beijing's standpoint the Dalai Lama's itinerary puts the spotlight on two tightly interconnected problems: the contested boundary with India, and Tibet.

China formally claims all of Arunachal Pradesh, but it views Tawang as an area where its historical claims are particularly strong. India, however, insists that the boundary in this entire sector should follow the alignment formalised in the tripartite Shimla Conference of 1913-14. The McMahon Line, as it came to be called after the then foreign secretary of India, was defined in a set of notes exchanged between Henry McMahon and the chief Tibetan delegate. This line was then marked on the map of the draft convention, which was initialled by the Chinese as well as British Indian and Tibetan representatives.

The Chinese government, however, repudiated the Shimla Convention owing to their disagreement vis-à-vis the boundaries between Tibet and China, and their desire to curb British attempts at enhancing Tibet's autonomy. China would later insist that Tibet had no right to conclude an agreement with India; for this would amount to accepting that Tibet had de facto independence in 1914. Independent India would hold that Tibet was part of China, but that in 1913-14 it had possessed treaty-making powers.

After the Shimla Conference the Indian government did not make efforts to extend its administrative presence right up to the McMahon Line. Republican China was a shambles, and posed no significant threat in the Assam Himalaya. The McMahon Line came to the fore in 1935, following an incident involving a British botanist studying the frontier tracts and Tibetan officials who controlled the area surrounding the Buddhist monastery in Tawang. Between 1938 and 1944, the Indian government belatedly sought to make good on the McMahon Line; but to no avail. Lhasa refused to withdraw its personnel from Tawang; and the British were chary of offending the Chinese - now their ally in the struggle against the Axis powers. Consequently, the Raj's administrative control could not be extended to Tawang.

Following Chinese invasion of Tibet, New Delhi decided in February 1951 to bring Tawang under its administrative hold. Interestingly, the move evoked no response from Beijing, but Lhasa protested vehemently. China's current claim to Tawang rests largely on the fact that it came under Indian control only in 1951. India's stance relies on the fact that Tawang fell on the Indian side of the McMahon Line; that its populace are Monba not ethnic Tibetans; and that Tawang had a religious not political relationship with Lhasa.

Territorial claim apart, Tawang also impacts on China's policies towards Tibet. Up to the 1950s the Tibetan administration - under the present Dalai Lama - had strongly contested India's takeover of Tawang. Beijing is concerned that if it dilutes its claims on Tawang, the Tibetans (especially the exile community) could denounce it as a sell-out on Tibetan interests and as underlining China's lack of legitimacy in Tibet. More important, there are deeper concerns about the intentions of the Indian government and the Dalai Lama vis-à-vis Tibet.

Back in 1954 India signed agreement with China recognising Tibet as a region of China and renouncing the special privileges in Tibet inherited from the Raj. These, as the then foreign secretary observed, were "a concession only to realism". However, the activities of Tibetan émigrés in border towns like Kalimpong stoked China's suspicions about Indian intentions. These steadily intensified as a rebellion broke out in Tibet in 1958. Beijing assumed, wrongly, that India was colluding with the rebels. India's decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama gave further credence to these suspicions. By mid-1959 the Chinese were convinced that India sought to make Tibet an independent, buffer state. These perceptions played a major role in China's decision to go to war in 1962.

Over the years, these concerns have been diminished but never fully allayed. This is mainly owing to presence of the Tibetan government-in-exile in India. The Indian government does not recognise the government-in-exile and has repeatedly stated that it would not allow the organisation to undertake political activities. But the Chinese are sceptical of India's disavowals.

The Dalai Lama, for his part, has moved away from his claim for Tibetan independence towards the "middle way" aimed at securing autonomy. But the mistrust between the two sides persists. As part of his autonomy proposals, the Dalai Lama seeks the integration under a single administrative entity of all the areas populated by ethnic Tibetans. The Chinese believe that the creation of a "greater Tibet" is merely a tactical ploy, designed to establish a platform for eventual independence. Hence, they insist that the Dalai Lama must accept that Tibet has always been a part of China. The Tibetans are unwilling to make such a concession as it might further undermine their case for autonomy. Besides, the Tibetan exiles are not a monolith. Chinese are wary of the influence of groups like the Tibetan Youth Congress that continue to demand independence.

The situation inside Tibet in the last year-and-a-half has heightened Beijing's sensitivities to the Dalai Lama's activities. From its perspective, the Tibetan leader's visit to Tawang brings together a number of thorny issues at a difficult time. New Delhi has handled China's response with tact and maturity. But it has to ensure that the Dalai Lama does not make any political statement that could lead to further acrimony with China. Beyond this, however, it has to think of ways to assuage the lingering Chinese concerns about its attitude to Tibet.

Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi