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  Books   A wide-ranging review of India’s defence and decision-making

A wide-ranging review of India’s defence and decision-making

Published : Feb 10, 2016, 12:45 am IST
Updated : Feb 10, 2016, 12:45 am IST

The matters that the title of this compendium covers, hinge upon civil-military relations, the very foundation of which, in India, is unfortunately, rotten.

Core concerns in indian defence and the imperatives for reforms By Vinod Misra IDSA & Pentagon Press, pp. 374, Rs 1,095
 Core concerns in indian defence and the imperatives for reforms By Vinod Misra IDSA & Pentagon Press, pp. 374, Rs 1,095

The matters that the title of this compendium covers, hinge upon civil-military relations, the very foundation of which, in India, is unfortunately, rotten. For India, attaining independence after ten centuries of being ruled, in the most crucial aspects of security and integrity, was skewered from the start.

India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and third Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon not only left no stone unturned in sowing weeds in civil-military relations, but were also utterly disastrous for India’s security. Till date the nation is paying dearly on both counts. The politico-bureaucratic combine continued to degrade both the status and morale of the Services and India’s security related to two of its adversaries.

The Indo-Pak wars of 1947-48 and 1965, the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the fourth war waged by Pakistan — “bleeding India by a million cuts” by use of proxy terrorism — which is continuing, all stand out as classic examples of soft options/approaches, for which India continues to pay a heavy price in blood and expense.

In the 1947-48 Indo-Pak war neither the Navy, nor the Air Force was used. As for India’s responses to before and during the Chinese aggression of 1962, the less said the better. Both Nehru and Menon, refused to accept that there was a definite threat building up, for which the Indian Army was woefully under-armed, ill-equipped and worse still, ill-clad. The fighting element of the Air Force, which could have been a life-saver and war-stopper, was not used. For the 1965 war, although Indian Army at long last got a new assault rifle, India’s decision makers continued to be sea-blind; the Naval Chief was out of the planning loop and visited the battle areas only as an observer.

Having reached the outskirts of Lahore, the Indian Army was stopped from going further and its vital blood-soaked gain of Haji Pir post in Kashmir was handed back to Pakistan on a platter during the Tashkent Talks. That loss is believed to have cost then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri his life. He returned from the Tashkent peace talks in a coffin and a shocked nation got glimpses of his darkened face at his funeral. Except for going soft as mentioned, Shastri did break the jinx of civil-military relations by conferring and agreeing with the military leadership.

Shastri was succeeded by Indira Gandhi, whose first acid test on national security was her response to the Chinese upping the ante in Nathu La, Sikkim in 1967. By sanctioning the use of artillery, which accounted for the killing of about 400 Chinese soldiers and destruction of many vehicles and bunkers (not unreported in media), she in one fell stroke overturned her own father’s flawed policy on China.

So far, since 1947, it is only Mrs Gandhi who earned the reputation of being the only man amongst all of India’s political leaders. In 1967, she sanctioned artillery bombardment against the Chinese army in Sikkim. The 1971 Indo-Pak war remains unprecedented owing to her assertiveness on India’s security at a time when Pakistan was supported by the US on one hand and its adversary China on the other. Unlike her father, she sought and accepted the advice of the military leadership and for the first time in India’s post Independence history, sanctioned the use of the Navy, which turned out to be a brilliant move.

In a well-planned and coordinated operation, erstwhile East Pakistan was surrounded within less than two weeks, forcing 93,000 Pakistan Armed Forces personnel and civilians to tearfully lay down their arms and surrender unconditionally. Pakistani prisoners of war (PsOW) could not believe that they were not ill-treated or tortured as was Pak army’s normal practice against Indian personnel. While even the presence of the US 7th Fleet in Indian waters of the Arabian Sea did not make Mrs Gandhi lose any sleep, where she faltered at last was during the Shimla talks, when she fell for Zulfikar Bhutto’s dramatics/lies and did not bargain 12,000 sq km of Pakistan’s territory captured in the Western sector and the 93,000 Pak POWs as major bargaining chips for Pak laying off Kashmir.

A rare case of cordial relations between former Army Chief, late Gen B.C. Joshi and then Defence Secretary N.N. Vohra resulted in sanctions and implementation of a number of path-breaking projects like Rashtriya Rifles, Army colleges, ecological battalions etc.

On the important aspect of Chief of Defence Staff, Defence Minister, Manohar Parikkar, has stated that he would soon appoint one. Although he is seen as sincere and decisive, former Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash has stated in the book, ”while the military seethes with dissatisfaction at perceived imbalances, the political establishment and civilian bureaucracy are quite content with the way things are, and remain staunch upholders of status quo”.

In the book IDSA has to put together perceptions, views and recommendations of a fair mix of 17 bureaucrats, military commanders, diplomats and scholars who have deep insights into the complex gamut of India’s defence and its decision-making structures and process. The book comes at a time when the BJP government is trying to revitalise the process of the Armed Forces’ modernisation/replacements/new acquisitions, which had been much neglected during two terms of the UPA. It had brought in a state of depletion of critical arms and equipment in the Services, while the arsenals of China and Pakistan have increased tremendously. During UPA’s tenure many defence purchases were put on hold by then Defence Minister A. K. Antony and today the Armed Forces lack modern armament like aircraft and artillery.

Vinod Misra has presented a detailed analysis on acquisition in defence. Missile scientist Dr Sivathanu Pillai has written a comprehensive article on the Defence Research and Development Organisation. Lt. Gen.Satish Nambiar, writing on defence manpower, has projected the professionalism achieved by the Indian Armed Forces and given valuable recommendations. Ravindra Gupta’s article covers how to strengthen India’s defence and industrial base. Contributions by Satya Narain Misra and Laxman Kumar Behera provide suggestions on the Arms Trade Offset. Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary, has written on India’s security environment and its impact on India’s defence.

Satya Narain Mishra has elaborated on India’s military industry complex, of nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings, (DPSUs). DPSUs are engaged in the manufacture of a wide range of products like helicopters, fighters, warships, submarines, patrol vessels, heavy vehicles and earthmovers, missiles and a variety of electronic devices.40 Ordnance Factories are engaged in producing small arms and ammunition, clothing, besides armoured and transport vehicles.

Yet, India has been one of the world’s biggest importers of defence equipment, which often involved corrupt practices. The Rs 64 crores Bofors guns scandal in the 1980s cost then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi his office. It remains to be seen how BJP Government’s attempts at inter-governmental deals and Make In India progress. The book is worth referring to by all in the government related to national security.