Back-channeling by third party or even parties in crisis management and mitigation between India and Pakistan is a reality
US President Donald Trump (SAUL LOEB / AFP)
On May 10, the former Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. V.P. Malik, put out a rather cryptic tweet.
He said: “Ceasefire 10 May 25: We have left India’s future history to ask what politico-strategic advantages, if any, were gained after its kinetic and non-kinetic actions post Pakistani horrific terror strike in Pahalgam on 22 Apr[il].”
What then are the lessons for the India-Pakistan dynamic of those 65 hours from 1 am in the morning of May 7, 2025, to 5 pm in the evening of May 10, 2025, when India launched kinetic strikes at select terror sites in Pakistan and the latter responded although inefficaciously?
The first is that back channeling by third party or even parties in crisis management and mitigation between India and Pakistan is a reality. Second, does conventional deterrence against semi-state actors has intrinsic limitations. Can it proscribe a terror attack in the future? That remains an open-ended question. Third, whenever there is a flashpoint between India and Pakistan, the latter tries to push its agenda of hyphenation albeit unsuccessfully. Fourth, when India and Pakistan are on an escalatory spiral there are no institutional off-ramps, that is the experience of both 2019 and 2024. Fifth, Pakistan still remains a strategic project of the West notwithstanding its tactical convergence with China and documented status as an epicentre of global terrorism. Sixth, whenever tensions between these two de-facto nuclear states spike the United States of America does become the principal actor in tamping things down.
There is a crucial distinction between back channeling in crisis management and mitigation and third-party mediation. Third-party mediation has a distinct connotation in law whereby the two parties to a dispute or a lis agree to arbitration by a mediator or a panel of arbitrators by crystalising the issues and letting the arbitrators/mediators resolve them. Back-channeling is more fluid and informal whereby messages can or may go back and forth with “concerned” parties talking to both sides. At times both these concepts are used interchangeably though they mean two different things altogether.
The American back-channeling in India-Pakistan crisis mitigation has been a given now, going back three-and-a-half decades.
On May 19, 1990, the then deputy national security adviser of the US Robert Gates travelled to New Delhi after a similar visit to Pakistan as the emissary of President George H.W. Bush. Though the Gates mission remains shrouded in secrecy till now “informed wisdom” has it that American intelligence had picked up credible information about nuclear weapons being mated with delivery platforms in Pakistan. This was ostensibly in response to Pakistan’s erroneous paranoia about an alleged Indian build-up in the western desert. The Gates visit was seen as an attempt to cool things down.
During Kargil in 1999, there was active back-channeling by the US with Nawaz Sharif landing up uninvited and unannounced on July 4, 1999, at the White House to try and persuade President Clinton to tell India to end its response to the Kargil transgressions.
Then again in the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, India commenced its largest ever military mobilisation after the 1971 war. In the midst of Operation Parakram on May 14, 2002, the Kaluchak massacre took place, when the families of armed forces personnel were slaughtered by Pakistani terrorists bringing things to precipice. There again was very active back-channeling led by the US, especially the then US secretary of state Gen. Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage pulled things back from the metaphorical brink.
In 2008, when the 26/11 attacks took place there must have been back-channeling to try and see that things remain under a modicum of restraint. For 14 months later on January 19, 2010, Robert Gates, then US secretary of defence, said: “I believe that the Indians responded subsequently with a great deal of restraint and have conducted themselves in a very statesmanlike manner since that attack.”
The same back-channeling would have happened in 2016 after the post Uri attack surgical strikes.
The difference between the back-channeling that used to take place earlier and that in 2019 and 2025 is that previously it was done quietly. The people who were trying to temper down the situation would not publicly claim credit for it. The metamorphosis now is that President Donald Trump claims credit upfront.
On February 28, 2019, at a press conference in Hanoi, he announced that there was good news from India and that India and Pakistan were going to pull back. The same thing happened on May 10, 2025, at about 5 pm in the evening.
Trump posted the following on his social media platforms. “After a long night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a full and immediate cease-fire,” he said. “Congratulations to both countries on using common sense and great intelligence. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”
It was followed by a statement by US secretary of state Marco Rubio’s on May 10, 2025, announcing that the US brokered ceasefire between India and Pakistan. It contained the following formulation, “I am pleased to announce the governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to an immediate ceasefire and to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.”
Such a formulation about “talks” was there in the February 25, 2021, ceasefire agreement that the two DGMOs had announced. It said the two DGMOs agreed to “address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb peace and lead to violence”. In the abovementioned modus vivendi between India and Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ostensibly took an active interest.
In the practice of international relations back channeling is a given. Can it in lay person’s language be called arbitration, mediation or dispute resolution? That, of course, is the articulator’s prerogative.
He said: “Ceasefire 10 May 25: We have left India’s future history to ask what politico-strategic advantages, if any, were gained after its kinetic and non-kinetic actions post Pakistani horrific terror strike in Pahalgam on 22 Apr[il].”
What then are the lessons for the India-Pakistan dynamic of those 65 hours from 1 am in the morning of May 7, 2025, to 5 pm in the evening of May 10, 2025, when India launched kinetic strikes at select terror sites in Pakistan and the latter responded although inefficaciously?
The first is that back channeling by third party or even parties in crisis management and mitigation between India and Pakistan is a reality. Second, does conventional deterrence against semi-state actors has intrinsic limitations. Can it proscribe a terror attack in the future? That remains an open-ended question. Third, whenever there is a flashpoint between India and Pakistan, the latter tries to push its agenda of hyphenation albeit unsuccessfully. Fourth, when India and Pakistan are on an escalatory spiral there are no institutional off-ramps, that is the experience of both 2019 and 2024. Fifth, Pakistan still remains a strategic project of the West notwithstanding its tactical convergence with China and documented status as an epicentre of global terrorism. Sixth, whenever tensions between these two de-facto nuclear states spike the United States of America does become the principal actor in tamping things down.
There is a crucial distinction between back channeling in crisis management and mitigation and third-party mediation. Third-party mediation has a distinct connotation in law whereby the two parties to a dispute or a lis agree to arbitration by a mediator or a panel of arbitrators by crystalising the issues and letting the arbitrators/mediators resolve them. Back-channeling is more fluid and informal whereby messages can or may go back and forth with “concerned” parties talking to both sides. At times both these concepts are used interchangeably though they mean two different things altogether.
The American back-channeling in India-Pakistan crisis mitigation has been a given now, going back three-and-a-half decades.
On May 19, 1990, the then deputy national security adviser of the US Robert Gates travelled to New Delhi after a similar visit to Pakistan as the emissary of President George H.W. Bush. Though the Gates mission remains shrouded in secrecy till now “informed wisdom” has it that American intelligence had picked up credible information about nuclear weapons being mated with delivery platforms in Pakistan. This was ostensibly in response to Pakistan’s erroneous paranoia about an alleged Indian build-up in the western desert. The Gates visit was seen as an attempt to cool things down.
During Kargil in 1999, there was active back-channeling by the US with Nawaz Sharif landing up uninvited and unannounced on July 4, 1999, at the White House to try and persuade President Clinton to tell India to end its response to the Kargil transgressions.
Then again in the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, India commenced its largest ever military mobilisation after the 1971 war. In the midst of Operation Parakram on May 14, 2002, the Kaluchak massacre took place, when the families of armed forces personnel were slaughtered by Pakistani terrorists bringing things to precipice. There again was very active back-channeling led by the US, especially the then US secretary of state Gen. Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage pulled things back from the metaphorical brink.
In 2008, when the 26/11 attacks took place there must have been back-channeling to try and see that things remain under a modicum of restraint. For 14 months later on January 19, 2010, Robert Gates, then US secretary of defence, said: “I believe that the Indians responded subsequently with a great deal of restraint and have conducted themselves in a very statesmanlike manner since that attack.”
The same back-channeling would have happened in 2016 after the post Uri attack surgical strikes.
The difference between the back-channeling that used to take place earlier and that in 2019 and 2025 is that previously it was done quietly. The people who were trying to temper down the situation would not publicly claim credit for it. The metamorphosis now is that President Donald Trump claims credit upfront.
On February 28, 2019, at a press conference in Hanoi, he announced that there was good news from India and that India and Pakistan were going to pull back. The same thing happened on May 10, 2025, at about 5 pm in the evening.
Trump posted the following on his social media platforms. “After a long night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a full and immediate cease-fire,” he said. “Congratulations to both countries on using common sense and great intelligence. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”
It was followed by a statement by US secretary of state Marco Rubio’s on May 10, 2025, announcing that the US brokered ceasefire between India and Pakistan. It contained the following formulation, “I am pleased to announce the governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to an immediate ceasefire and to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.”
Such a formulation about “talks” was there in the February 25, 2021, ceasefire agreement that the two DGMOs had announced. It said the two DGMOs agreed to “address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb peace and lead to violence”. In the abovementioned modus vivendi between India and Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ostensibly took an active interest.
In the practice of international relations back channeling is a given. Can it in lay person’s language be called arbitration, mediation or dispute resolution? That, of course, is the articulator’s prerogative.
( Source : Asian Age )
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