According to the New York Times, this assessment led to Iran becoming smug -- that Israel was unlikely to attack while talks with the US were continuing. They were to resume on June 15, but Israel attacked on June 13, catching Iran by surprise
US President Donald Trump wrote to the Iranian leadership on March 25 suggesting talks. Mr Trump, during his first term, had junked the nuclear deal between Iran and the Permanent Five (the veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council), plus Germany. Called the Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action (JCPOA), it allowed Iran, under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), limited uranium enrichment. But the restrictions on Iran were for a limited period, making it unacceptable to both Israel and the US under Mr Trump.
Although the US-Iran dialogue began recently in Oman, Israel continued to threaten an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. On May 16 the US tabled its offer, which Iran did not immediately accept. The social media posts of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, began to reflect the Iranian irritation. On June 4, he characterised the US proposal as “100% against the spirit of ‘We Can’”. He said the US demanded that Iran “should have no nuclear industry”. President Trump too publicly sounded “less confident” of a deal. It still seemed that while the US wanted a peaceful resolution, Israel was pushing for a military solution.
According to the New York Times, this assessment led to Iran becoming smug -- that Israel was unlikely to attack while talks with the US were continuing. They were to resume on June 15, but Israel attacked on June 13, catching Iran by surprise. Senior Iranian military commanders were sleeping at home rather than in underground shelters. Gen. Amir Ali Haji Saade was meeting senior commanders at a military base which was attacked, killing them. The Israeli ability to target Iranian nuclear scientists in the past, the head of Hamas in Tehran and now military commanders indicates that it could successfully penetrate the Iranian military and intelligence networks.
US President Donald Trump’s reaction to the Israeli attacks betrays full coordination between Israel and the US. Similarly, although the Saudis promptly condemned the attacks, 200 Israeli fighter aircraft could not be hovering over Iran without utilising the airspace of multiple Arab countries. Mr Trump’s remark that “there’s more to come, a lot more”, indicates more than casual interest. Thus, the US, and tacitly its Gulf allies, accept Israel applying military pressure on Iran while they keep advocating a peaceful resolution. Iran has refused to attend the June 15 talks.
According to media reports, Israel attacked 15 locations in Iran. Natanz has Iran’s largest uranium enrichment plant, which is above ground. Smaller facilities exist at Isfahan and, embedded in a mountain, at Fordow. IAEA inspectors, who recently visited Isfahan, revealed that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent is stored there. Although Isfahan was targeted, the storage facility was spared. Perhaps Israel did not want to risk causing massive radioactive pollution.
The Iranians retaliated by firing around 100 missiles at seven locations in Tel Aviv. The loss of human lives was limited, but videos and pictures showed extensive damage to some buildings, including the military headquarters. Israel too has resumed attacks on new Iranian targets. Hence, the duel between the two countries continues. The Iranian problem is their air defences and missile launch sites have been damaged. Hence, they could launch only 100 missiles and not the promised larger barrage, to overwhelm Israeli air defences.
The only major countries condemning the Israeli attacks are Russia and China. India adopted the usual middle-of-the-road policy, preaching restraint and peaceful resolution. Iran has limited options. Pakistan, as “Operation Sindoor” unfolded, like Iran, also found its air defences neutralised. India had begun widening the attack on Pakistani military targets. Pakistan shrewdly sought a ceasefire, while claiming a victory, having earlier shot down some Indian fighter aircraft. Iran needs visible material damage in Israel to claim similar success. Although aware of American complicity, it has avoided targeting any American military facility or asset.
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that its attacks will lead to a regime change in Iran. That would be the best-case scenario for the US too. With the Gaza Strip in total disarray, the Hezbollah contained and the Bashar al-Assad regime ousted in Syria, Iran is the last hurdle to ushering regional stability on terms prescribed by the US-Israel axis, and endorsed by the GCC members. India, of course, has a stake in that outcome as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) requires stability to be restored quickly in the Gulf and the West Asian regions.
The problem for India is the revived relevance of nuclear weapons-possessing Sunni Pakistan to balancing Shia Iran, with nuclear weapons capability. Today, Iran has over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. With at least 25 kg uranium, enriched to 90 per cent, required for one nuclear bomb, Iran has enough material for 10 bombs or more. Israel wants to stymie that Iranian capability.
There are risks in that strategy. One, Iran is a huge country with extensive mountain ranges, allowing the dispersal of its nuclear assets. Two, despite the Islamic regime’s low popularity, most Iranians tend to rally behind their government when threatened by a foreign power. Their historical heritage dates from the regionally dominant Achaemenid empire (550 BC to 330 BC). They also imbibe the martyrdom inherent in the Shia faith. Moreover, they are geographically a vast nation with a population of 91 million and a calibrated democratic system.
President Trump, by openly supporting Israel’s military attack, has negated his ability to mediate a peaceful outcome. He favours leverage as a negotiating instrument, like in a business deal. That ignores the role of religion, history and cultural ethos in conditioning national behaviour. Recent US experience demonstrates that military force does not necessarily obtain the intended outcomes.
The US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan being prime examples. China and Russia have a key interest in the Iranian regime not buckling. Will one of them facilitate a quick Iranian transition to the possession of nuclear weapons? Pushed to the wall, Iran may well decide that deterrence can only be restored by acquiring nuclear weapons.
The region is therefore at an inflection point. The US wants to shape outcomes using surrogates, unlike in the past by direct involvement. The result may be worse now. India’s stakes are high due to its eight million-plus diaspora living in the Gulf, massive trade links and energy security. By its clear tilt towards the far-right Israeli government, India has weakened its ability to help de-escalate the crisis.
