Pavan K. Varma | Govt Must Clearly Explain What Led to the Ceasefire
In a democracy, the government must, within the constraints of national interest, take the people into confidence, and not stonewall any questions by deliberate jingoism
On October 1962, China launched a war against India, and the government declared a National Emergency. In the midst of this, a young 36-year-old first time Rajya Sabha MP from the Jan Sangh, one of the smallest parties in Parliament, asked Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to hold a Special Session of Parliament. Nehru’s Congress government enjoyed a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. At 72, he was exactly twice Vajpayee’s age. But Nehru agreed to Atal Behari Vajpayee’s request, and rejected the suggestion by his own party members that it should be a “secret session”. When Parliament met, Vajpayee made a scathing attack on the government. Nehru did not think this to be unpatriotic.
History should serve as a guide. When Operation Sindoor was on, the people of India stood united with the government, and fully supported our brave armed forces who put their life at stake to successfully fight it. However, now that there is a ceasefire, the government cannot silence even a legitimate question relating to the operation on the ground that it is anti-national. In a democracy, the government must, within the constraints of national interest, take the people into confidence, and not stonewall any questions by deliberate jingoism. In particular, there are very pertinent questions on what brought the war so abruptly to an end.
Exact details on how many planes we lost, or did not, is not important. In any war, there will be some losses, and the government has provided sufficient visual proof of the damage we caused to vital installations in Pakistan. Yet, beyond the theatre of war, some serious contradictions have now come in the public realm on how and why the ceasefire was reached. Howard Lutnick, the American secretary of commerce (which means commerce minister in President Donald Trump’s Cabinet), has on May 23 said on oath in the US Court of International Trade that the ceasefire was “only achieved” after Trump stepped in and offered trading access to both India and Pakistan in order to “avert a full-scale nuclear war”.
However, earlier on May 13, Randhir Jaiswal, the official spokesperson of the ministry of external affairs said on public record exactly the opposite. In his press briefing he said that there were only “conversations” between Indian and American leaders between May 7 and May 10, and “the issues of trade did not come up for any discussion”. Mr Jaiswal further said that the ceasefire was reached through “direct contact” between India and Pakistan, and “not via US mediation’.
Readers will agree that the two versions, between that of one of the senior-most ministers of America on oath in a court of law, and what our official spokesperson has said in a press briefing, are directly opposed to each other. How does the Indian public reconcile these inexplicably opposite stances? It also remains a mystery how President Trump was the one to announce the ceasefire when our official spokesperson has publicly said that the ceasefire was reached between India and Pakistan through “direct contact”. What then was America’s role in the matter?
Whatever the truth may be, the priority is not that we impolitely rebuff Trump on his claims. We have too much at stake in continuing cordial relations with the US, and it would be gratuitous to have a public spat over this matter. It is enough to issue a dignified denial, which we have done. However, the real concern is that in the face of America’s assumption of credit for playing a mediatory role, how many countries in the world believe our version is right? Senior Russian diplomat, Yury Ushakov, formerly Russia’s ambassador to Washington, and trusted foreign policy adviser to President Vladimir Putin since 2012, has only two days ago endorsed the US position by saying that the armed conflict between Indian and Pakistan was “halted with the personal involvement” of Trump. If Russia believes that, and gives no credence to our denials, how many other countries are buying our narrative? A consequence of this is the one thing we have assiduously tried to avoid all these years: The hyphenation of India and Pakistan, and the space for any outside power to have a mediatory role in our bilateral matters.
The truth is that we need to introspect on whether our foreign policy outreach needs to be revamped. During Operation Sindoor, only France and Israel explicitly condemned Pakistan, and supported our right of self-defence against the terrorism sponsored by it. Trump did not even mention Pakistani terrorism, although Osama bin Laden, the perpetrator of 9/11 — the world’s biggest Islamic terrorist attack — was found comfortably hiding in Pakistan. Other major powers preferred to only advise restraint to both India and Pakistan, thereby conflating the victim and the perpetrator. In spite of scores of Pakistani citizens being on the UN’s proscribed international terrorist list, and designated as “global terrorists” by America, Pakistan has just become the chair of the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee against the Taliban, and the vice-chair of the UNSC’s Counter Terrorism Panel. Both these appointments need the concurrence of the Permanent 5 on the Security Council, and its non-permanent members. But the appointments faced no hurdle, nor did the IMF bail-out and other international loans, even though these globally proscribed terrorists roam around freely in Pakistan. Foreign policy is a continuum, and not episodic, and one globe-trotting mission by groups of MPs is unlikely to materially change the perception deficit we face.
A mature dialogue within a democracy is a sign of strength, not weakness. Why does the US version of the ceasefire differ so much from ours? To ask such questions in the right language and a constructive spirit is not tantamount to being anti-national. On its part, it is incumbent for a government in a democracy to clarify such matters, either through a Special Session of Parliament, or an all-party briefing. Holding Tiranga Yatras for electoral benefit is not the answer. Such partisan politicisation of war is tempting for any political party, but there is something shallow and opportunist about it. The historic example set by Vajpayee and Nehru must not be forgotten.