Manish Tewari | Global Climate Governance: Why We Must Change It Now

In November 2025, the two major global conferences took place — COP30 in Belem, Brazil; and, G20 in Johannesburg, South Africa. Although partly aligned in rhetoric they underscored contrasting visions of climate action and multilateral cooperation. Both summits acknowledged the urgency of climate action but the outcomes of COP30 and G20 summits demonstrated a significant disparity in their perspectives on issues relating to fossil fuels and climate finance. Furthermore, they revealed significant fractures within the existing global governance institutions and posed essential challenges for many countries including India.

COP30 came to an end with a huge letdown. The final deal did not include any binding commitments on phasing out fossil fuel use, despite calls from more than 80 countries, including the EU, Colombia, Panama and Uruguay. Although there was pressure for the summit to adopt explicit language on reducing coal, oil and gas use, the end result of COP30 was only a set of voluntary, non-binding roadmaps for transitioning to other sources of energy. In addition, two tracks (one within the UN and one outside) were established — essentially taking enforcement mechanisms away from both tracks.

Similarly, the G20 exercised caution when issuing a leader’s declaration that recognised the need to treat climate change as an emergency and stated a goal of tripling renewable energy use by 2030 without explicitly using fossil fuel phase-out language. While endorsing the concept of “technology neutrality” as a means of achieving transitions to low carbon energy sources, the declaration regarded “energy security” as an acceptable reason to invest in fossil fuels as well as renewables. The content was hurriedly put together in order to reach consensus among all member nations; therefore, ambition was sacrificed in favour of agreement.

The fossil fuel fault line: Fossil fuel interests represent the greatest area of divergence among participants in either summit. Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other oil-producing countries (e.g., UAE) were instrumental in blocking legally binding commitments to reduce emissions at both meetings. Saudi Arabia has been especially successful in blocking the introduction of specific language regarding phasing out fossil fuels, despite being a participant in prior global climate summits. Ultimately, the ability of these countries to unite as major emitters, coupled with a desire for consensus among developed nations and a division among developing and developed nations, resulted in a lack of political will to develop a global fossil fuel limit.

India, while championing climate equity and renewable energy deployment, also resisted absolute fossil fuel timelines. India justified this position on grounds of development necessity, arguing that developed nations bear historical responsibility for emissions and must finance transitions in poorer countries first. Though rooted in legitimate equity principles, this stance complicated efforts to establish universal fossil fuel commitments.

The climate finance gap: The COP30 and G20 summits underscored a persistent global finance deficit. COP30 announced a goal of reaching $1.3 trillion in adaptation finance by 2035, but without binding funding pathways or accountability mechanisms. The G20 similarly acknowledged the need to move from “billions to trillions” but offered little clarity on mobilisation strategies. Developing nations require around $5.8–$5.9 trillion annually by 2030 to meet climate targets, far beyond present commitments. The long-standing failure of developed countries to fulfil promises dating back to Rio (1992) continues to erode trust and legitimacy in global climate cooperation. As India argues on behalf of the Global South, this shortfall is not only a financing gap — it is a violation of climate equity and justice.

Fragmenting global governance: These results demonstrate a significant change in the manner in which global governance operates, moving away from the concept of universal and legally binding agreements, towards the use of more voluntary, responsive and adaptable coalitions, minilateral initiatives, and flexible regimes within the framework of “fragmented multilateralism”. Fragmented multilateralism enables willing coalitions to act with greater agility and might also create a new “two-tiered” system whereby nations committed to climate change action would continue to make progress while fossil fuel-dependent nations would maintain their current position.

The absence of the US from these negotiations (the Trump administration's boycotting of the G20, and its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement process) presents both an opportunity for simplification and an exposing of the underlying weakness of the existing multilateral structure. As noted by several observers, “the world is no longer waiting for Washington”, yet, there is still no clear alternative to the previous model of multilateral leadership. The end result is the emergence of numerous independent, uncoordinated, and competitive initiatives lacking any overarching mechanism of accountability and enforcement.

India’s strategic position: India views the fractured climate landscape with caution. It has exceeded earlier renewable energy targets and reduced emissions intensity by 36 per cent since 2005, demonstrating that development and climate action can progress together. Yet coal still generates over 74 pc of India’s electricity, with no fixed phase-out timeline reflecting the continued global tension between growth and decarbonization.

At both summits, India advocated climate justice, a just transition mechanism, and opposed unilateral measures like the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. It advanced the critical circularity initiative for critical minerals, strengthening resource security while supporting sustainable material use. The delayed submission of India’s 2035 climate targets indicates a calibrated strategy ambitious, but deliberately flexible.

The COP30 and G20 conferences have shown that although nations have made promises through the use of rhetoric regarding reaching net-zero and taking climate action, there are no binding mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with those promises and fossil fuel interests still maintain a veto over the process. Global climate governance relies heavily on voluntary frameworks and consensus-seeking approaches to create an institutional framework that is at odds with the immediate need for the transformative changes that climate change science makes clear are necessary.

Developing nations like India face the additional challenge of having to assert their diplomatic influence across multiple incompatible institutions while at the same time working towards building coalitions based on equity principles. The extent to which global governance will be able to overcome these divisions to address climate change effectively is still very uncertain.