K.C. Singh | Trump’s Dilemma Over Iran: Compromise Or a Long War?

Entering the sixth month of the war with Iran, the United States keeps issuing contradictory statements. President Donald Trump’s constant modification of claims and objectives, have perpetuated the confusion. While the final outcome is yet unclear, many factors that will condition it are visible.

The war began, with the US and Israel launching extensive air attacks on Iranian military facilities on February 28. More significantly, they also killed the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. President Trump promptly claimed that Iran stood “totally defeated and wants a deal”. The military campaign, he added, would last for two to three weeks. The aggressors completely underestimated the Iranian resilience and military preparedness. Iran demonstrated the ability to both bear the consequences of the massive airstrikes, but, more importantly, to retaliate, using drones and missiles. Having learnt from the US and Israeli attacks in June 2025, it had protectively located its military assets deep inside its extensive mountain ranges.

It emerged later that the operation was launched after White House briefings by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his team. They argued that after the supreme leader’s assassination, the killing of Army commanders and the rapid destruction of missile launch sites, the entire population of Iran would rise up in revolt against the Islamic regime. There were dissenting voices on the US side, but once President Trump gave his approval, the debate ended. Reportedly, US vice-president J.D. Vance is said to have berated the Israel Prime Minister for misleading the Americans.

As the war proceeded, the scenario got more complicated. The regime change claim was dropped even before the original June 17 ceasefire. In fact, President Trump strongly denied the US ever desired it. Iranian counter-strikes, using drones and missiles, targeted US military facilities in the Gulf countries, where important American bases operated. Iran also decided to shut down maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, of which it controls the entire northern periphery. Almost 20 per cent of the global oil production transits through this strait.

Consequently, the price of Brent crude spiked past $100 per barrel, reaching a peak of $126 per barrel, as global inventories depleted at historic rates between February and May. The US apparently had not expected Iran to use the Hormuz Strait as a retaliatory pressure point. This disruption of global oil supply also hit the US consumers with higher energy costs. The Trump administration now realises that with crucial midterm elections due at the beginning of November, the Iran crisis needed an early resolution. In fact, US House Speaker Mike Johnson, a strong Trump supporter, demanded that “we got to wrap it up”.

Generally, any war tapers off because of one of two reasons. One, a victor emerges and enforces the terms of submission. Two, both sides reach a point of exhaustion as a stalemate emerges. The second has been happening in the Ukraine war, but the Russian ego, especially of President Vladimir Putin, disallows a compromise. In the case of the Iran dispute, the US faces a similarly evolving scenario. Although the American Jewish lobby, alongside the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, wants the war escalated, polls indicate declining support for Israel even amongst the American Jewish community. Also, the latest Reuters-Ipsos poll indicates that only one in three Americans supports the US participation in the Iran war.

Meanwhile, Iran threatens to destroy the infrastructure of the GCC nations, if attacks on Iranian facilities are expanded. Thus, despite the US threats of general annihilation of Iran, the Iranians calculate that the US cannot escalate attacks beyond a limit. It also knows that it cannot deploy ground troops because the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are prepared for a strong fightback.

There are also reports that the US is running low on munitions and anti-missile interceptors. Of course, President Trump has publicly denied this. The US resumed hostilities on July 8, after more than three weeks of the June 17 ceasefire. This ceasefire breakdown has been attributed to the vagueness of the Memorandum of Understanding. As the US lifted their naval blockade Iran was supposed to allow free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, Iran began to collect fees from transiting vessels. When tankers or other freighters began using the Omani side of the strait, they were attacked by Iranian missiles.

Once the US airstrikes resumed, Iran too began retaliatory attacks, beginning with US military facilities in Jordan. There was always an indirect link between the Ukraine and Iran wars. Iran had been supplying drones to Russia for use and Ukraine had similarly transferred anti-drone munitions to the Gulf countries. A more direct link occurred when Ukraine attacked an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea. It was thus more than coincidental that President Donald Trump received in the White House on July 28 Ukraine’s President Volodymyr

Zelenskyy, and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Israeli leader was on his seventh visit to the US during President Trump’s current term. Terming his meeting with the US President as “excellent”, he added that it was a “conversation of full partnership… with an understanding of shared goals”. Denying Iran access to nuclear weapons was noted as the main goal.

Mr Netanyahu needed to project bonhomie and continuing US support as the polls show him trailing in the parliamentary elections due at the end of October.

America’s Gulf policy thus faces a serious dilemma. Mere air attacks are not intimidating Iran or eliminating its retaliatory capacity to disrupt maritime traffic through the Hormuz Strait. A comprehensive invasion with ground and air resources combined, with Kurds or Baluchis from neighbouring nations, carries a high risk of protracted conflict, loss of US troops and destruction of GCC economies and societies. Alternatively, a compromise involves allowing Iran joint control with Oman over the Strait. Omani diplomats were in Iran on July 25-26.

That leaves the nuclear issue. On July 22 a US-Saudi civilian nuclear deal was announced, reportedly allowing uranium enrichment for providing fuel for its planned reactors. It further complicates the issue. Iran now would not settle for less than that. Even the UAE would want its 2009 nuclear deal similarly upgraded.

Finally, the US can still persist with the status quo. It can maintain pressure on Iran through its naval blockade and await Iranian economic pain to force Tehran to compromise. But till then global economies face higher energy costs and even trade disruption.