K.C. Singh | Show Guile Abroad, Empathy at Home in War of Narratives
Domestically, a review of obvious intelligence lapses and military performance is necessary. Heated rhetoric and constant electioneering would not make the new reality disappear
The May 10 ceasefire, after India’s “Operation Sindoor”, ended the India-Pakistan hostilities for the time being, but set off a new battle of narratives. Pakistan declared victory, and promoted its Army chief, Gen. Asim Munir, to Field Marshal, almost aping Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s similar honouring of Field Marshal S.H.F.J. (Sam) Manekshaw, after Pakistan’s 1971 defeat in the Bangladesh war. India dispatched seven all-party delegations to 33 nations, to shift the focus back to Pakistan’s “state sponsorship” of terrorism.
This was dictated by both domestic and international factors. At home, the BJP’s hyper-nationalism has left it trapped. Unlike the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, when success in punishing Pakistan was successfully marketed, both electorally and otherwise, this time the BJP’s dominance of the narrative appears to have faltered. With India dominating the escalation, the sudden May 10 ceasefire left the public, especially the BJP’s own hardcore base, confused. US President Donald Trump claiming credit for mediating added to the unease. The public wondered if the United States, threatening trade sanctions, had enforced a ceasefire. India maintained that it was merely conceding a request from Pakistan’s director-general of military operations. The Opposition parties, led by the Congress, demanded a special session of Parliament and a full-fledged debate. Prime Minister Narendra Modi ignored these demands and merely addressed the nation.
Sending the seven all-party delegations abroad was aimed at countering the Opposition’s demands. However, a political controversy erupted when the government unilaterally named prominent Opposition figures as leaders of some delegations, besides including them as members. The Opposition acquiesced, as boycotting would have allowed the BJP to allege anti-nationalism.
Underlining this political upmanship was Shashi Tharoor’s selection to lead the delegation headed to the United States and some Caribbean and Latin American nations. He had been occasionally adopting BJP-sympathetic positions on certain issues, irritating the Congress high command. Although he looked a natural choice, as chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, but he carries the baggage of past controversies. Salman Khurshid, a former minister of external affairs, was a mere delegation member.
Any analysis of the outreach must begin with the choice of countries. India has three immediate concerns. One, Pakistan’s presence in the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member till end-2026. It chairs it in July. Two, India would like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to again put Pakistan on the “grey list”, which it escaped in 2022. Three, the international narrative needs to be redirected to Pakistan’s state-sponsorship of terrorism, from the resurrected Kashmir “dispute”.
The UNSC’s nine non-permanent members, besides Pakistan, are: Algeria, Denmark, Greece, Guyana, Panama, South Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and Somalia. Similarly, other than China, the delegations would also engage the four permanent members -- Russia, France, Britain and the US. Most nations are treating the delegations of parliamentarians as just that. Their interlocutors are not the heads of government but corresponding figures from actual or notional national assemblies. For instance, the democratic institutions in the six members of the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) are more symbolic than real. In the UAE, a meeting with Sheikh Nehyan was optically fine but he is a cousin of the powerful sons of late President Sheikh Zayed, borne by his favourite wife Sheikha Fatima, who control the presidency and other powerful institutions. The UAE will at best balance its relations with India and Pakistan and not openly side with India.
Some nations like Guyana, with a large politically active Indian diaspora, had Prime Minister Brig Mark Anthony Phillips (Retd) host a dinner for the Shashi Tharoor-led delegation. That would be an exception to what transpires elsewhere. Mr Tharoor claimed that they received a “tremendous amount of understanding” and a broader engagement with Guyana was discussed. That, strictly speaking, intruded into the domain of external affairs minister S. Jaishankar.
Undoubtedly, an outreach to the nine non-permanent members of the UNSC was necessary to stymie Pakistan’s designs in the UN Security Council. But finally, only a permanent member can veto a resolution. With Mr Trump already playing the referee and Russia re-balancing its relations with India and the China-Pakistan axis, it only leaves France or the UK to help contain the Pakistani mischief.
The Indian outreach also extends to those amongst the 38 members of the FATF, who are not UNSC members. India will underscore Pakistan’s support to militancy against India. But credibly establishing a direct Pakistani hand in the Pahalgam massacre is challenging. The actual killers are still at large and thus their identity is not firmly nailed. Indian dossiers have traditionally lacked specific proof linking Pakistan. In the present case, The Resistance Front (TRF), a new organisation fronting for the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, first claimed responsibility but then recanted. However, the presence of senior Pakistani military and police officers at the funerals of those killed in the attack on the Muridke headquarters of Lashkar demonstrated the continuing nexus between the state and non-state actors in Pakistan.
However, without active US support, placing Pakistan again on FATF’s “grey list” is challenging. India’s failure to stem the IMF funding for Pakistan shows the new reality. Pakistan seems to have convinced the Trump administration of its continuing utility to contain the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Iran. The role of GCC countries in this cannot be underestimated. All the hugs-and-awards are public theatre that the Gulf rulers effectively employ as a diplomatic tool. Their pampering of Mr Trump through gifts and indirect financial assistance to his family demonstrated a masterly neutralising of a dangerously unpredictable leader.
The deterrence that the Indian government thought it had established in 2019 stands compromised. The role of China is being speculated, not just as supplier of 71 per cent of Pakistan’s armaments imports, but in assisting Pakistan during the air battle via its BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS). India claims to have restored deterrence, with the threat of escalated retaliation if again targeted by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Pakistan has achieved its immediate objective of resurrecting the Kashmir issue and gaining international attention. It will now use its UNSC seat and Donald Trump’s proclivity for low-cost interventions to target India over Kashmir.
The Narendra Modi government must make peace with the Opposition at home and move quickly to win the hearts and minds of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, including by Swiftly restoring statehood. Dialogue with Pakistan on a calibrated agenda of river waters and terrorism will help keep self-appointed mediators away.
Domestically, a review of obvious intelligence lapses and military performance is necessary. Heated rhetoric and constant electioneering would not make the new reality disappear.