Claude Arpi | Flashback: Biju role, U-2 Flights, Charbatia & Tibet

It was recently alleged that Odisha’s Independence-era leader and former chief minister Biju Patnaik had helped the CIA to operate U-2 reconnaissance aircraft from Odisha’s Charbatia airbase, which hosted an American military presence in India in the 1960s. This infuriated most politicians in the state and the Prime Minister had to intervene to give a clean chit to the legendary Odia leader.

It is, however, worth taking a closer look at Charbatia airbase, located around 12 km north of Cuttack. According to Wikipedia: “It is an aerial reconnaissance post of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), an intelligence agency of the Centre.”

I first heard about Charbatia, Biju Patnaik’s baby, when I studied the participation of the Tibetan Special Frontier Force (or SFF) in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. While it was one of the best-guarded secrets, some informants mentioned that the SFF used to operate from Charbatia under the ARC, the air arm of the Research and Analytical Wing (RAW), then under the legendary R.N. Kao.

Two helicopter pilots were involved in the 1971 operations with the SFF -- Squadron Leader (later Wing Commander) P.R. Marathe and Flight Lieutenant (later Wing Commander) Parvez Rustom Jamasjee. Both had passed away recently.

Once, in a discussion with Marathe, he admitted that though personnel and equipment were from the Indian Air Force, the helicopter unit operating from Charbatia was under the ARC.

When asked why there had been no media coverage or information about the successes and impact of these missions supporting the Tibetan forces in the Chittagong Hills in 1971, his answer was: “All ARC operations were top secret.”

In early 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had tasked R.N. Kao to study the feasibility of sending SFF troops for special guerilla warfare tasks in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

A few years ago, the CIA declassified a series of documents on the history of the U-2 surveillance plane. I managed to acquire a copy of these files entitled: “The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974. The U-2 operations in India.”

It explains that in October 1962, China launched a series of massive surprise attacks against India’s frontier forces and “the Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north of the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.”

It was in those circumstances that the “Indian government appealed to the United States for military aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that Indian claims concerning the extent of the Chinese incursions could not be reliably evaluated.”

On November 11, 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the proposed operation and gave Washington permission to refuel the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace.

Detachment G of the U-2s made four overflights of the Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led China to lodge protests. “Photography from these missions was used in January and again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru”, though the latter never revealed the source of his intelligence inputs.

In the early 1960s, both the US and India were very concerned about China’s developing a nuclear weapons programme. On May 5, 1963, defence minister Y.B. Chavan, quoting B.N. Mullik, then director of the Intelligence Bureau, said that the Americans who had surveyed various airfields were “entirely in favour of Charbatia”.

It was Biju Patnaik’s suggestion. A freedom fighter, industrialist and charismatic politician, he was also an ace pilot and had detailed knowledge of China’s terrain along India’s border.

A few months later, during a meeting with India’s President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, US President John F. Kennedy raised the question of a permanent U-2 base in India. It resulted in an Indian offer (through Biju Patnaik) of an abandoned World War II camp at Charbatia: “The Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed considerable renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on the base by the Indians took much longer than expected.”

The United States had agreed to provide to India photographic coverage of the border area for two reasons: “First of all, US policymakers wanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the [US] intelligence setup wanted to establish a precedent for overflights from India.” They would never get this.

The first mission out of Charbatia did not take place until May 14, 1964. Some days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and all further operations were postponed.

In 2013, a major Indian newspaper quoted other declassified CIA files that “Nehru allowed American U-2 aircraft, which were conducting spy missions over China, to fly over and also station in India. In return, India got valuable intelligence reports.”

It is not well known, but an Indian pilot was fully involved in the setting up of Charbatia and even participated in some U-2 sorties over Tibet. In a biography of Air Vice-Marshal Chandan Singh, Maha Vir Chakra, it is said the ace pilot, who organised the dropping of French tanks AMX 13 in Chushul, Ladakh, in October 1962, was central to the project: “It is with the intelligence gathering part of the operation that Chandan Singh was deeply involved [in Charbatia].”

“The necessity for setting up the ARC was felt because one of the prime reasons for the humiliating defeat in 1962 was the total lack of intelligence about the Chinese military and logistics build-up in Tibet.”

Eight pilots were selected and sent to the United States for training with the CIA. Out of these six pre-selected, only two were found suitable for advanced training. Back in India, Chandan took command of the newly-established ARC base at Charbatia. Chandan Singh helped to set up the ARC at Charbatia and became its first commanding officer.

The biography of Chandan Singh says: “For deep penetration and long-distance flights over West China and Central Asia, U-2s were used. …They did not land back in India and generally flew to some base in Turkey or Germany. …On three such missions, Chandan flew with the CIA over Tibet and several times more independently. Sadly, none of the intelligence gathered was passed down to the defence forces on the pretext that such intelligence was of strategic value and for the Prime Minister’s eyes only.”

Biju Patnaik was indeed a great patriot.

This reminded me of Wing Commander Jag Mohan (“Jaggi”) Nath, who was twice awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, India’s second-highest wartime military decoration. He received his first MVC for taking thousands of photos of the Chinese Army occupying Tibet between 1960 and 1962. Most tragically, this crucial information was disregarded in New Delhi.

ENDS

Claude Arpi is Distinguished Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi), and writes on India, China, Tibet and Indo-French relations