Wasbir Hussain | New Ethnic Fault Line Worsens Security Scenario In Manipur

Manipur’s ethnic crisis, now onto its fourth year, is no longer adequately described simply as a Meitei-Kuki conflict.

That was the defining fault line when violence erupted on May 3, 2023. More than three years later, however, another and potentially consequential ethnic confrontation has opened up in the hills — between the Kuki-Zo and Naga communities.

What began in February this year with a seemingly local altercation in Litan, in Ukhrul district, has evolved into a cycle of killings, arson, abductions, blockades and retaliatory attacks. The February 7 brawl between Tangkhul Naga and Kuki youths was followed by attacks on homes and escalating community mobilisation. The subsequent violence has exposed much deeper disputes over land, territorial claims, political influence and competing notions of ethnic homeland. What we are witnessing is a blistering turf war among communities.

Human Rights Watch said in September that at least 34 people had been killed in Naga vs Kuki-Zo violence since February, with armed groups on both sides accused of burning homes, taking hostages, blocking highways and engaging in gunfire. That means the original conflict has acquired another layer — one that could make an already fragmented security landscape still more difficult to manage.

The latest killings make the point starkly. On September 24, four Tangkhul Naga civilians were killed in an attack in Pilong, Kamjong district, near the Myanmar border. Two days later, two more Naga civilians were shot dead in Senapati, with two others injured; one of the injured subsequently died.

It was against this backdrop that former chief minister N. Biren Singh took to X on September 26 with a stark warning: “More than 60 deaths since early this year, and the cycle of violence continues unchecked.” Condemning the killing of an individual each in Chaowainamai and Laii Shirafii village, he asked how long Manipur would continue “counting bodies” instead of holding perpetrators accountable and restoring law and order.

The significance of Mr Biren Singh’s intervention lies less in his political provenance and more in what his remarks reveal about the changing nature of the crisis. His latest comments are directed at violence involving Naga civilians — a reminder that the security challenge is no longer confined to the original Meitei-Kuki theatre.

Two days before his X post, Mr Singh had met governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla and called for identification and verification of cadres of Kuki rebel groups covered by the Suspension of Operations agreement and of groups involved in peace talks. He also called for a statewide combing operation against groups outside these arrangements.

These are serious proposals, but they also underline the central problem: who exactly are the armed actors now operating in Manipur, under what political or ethnic banner, and who exercises influence over them?

The answer is becoming increasingly complicated.

The Naga-Kuki confrontation has its own history. Territorial claims overlap. Communities that had lived alongside one another in several areas are now increasingly separated by fear and suspicion. Roads have become strategic assets. Blockades have become instruments of pressure. Villages have become markers of ethnic control.

This is how an ethnic conflict acquires permanence: not merely through the number of people killed, but through the gradual destruction of the conditions that once allowed communities to live, trade and travel together.

There is another worrying dimension. The latest violence has occurred even as political and administrative efforts have been made to restore normalcy. The United Naga Council recently suspended its economic blockade after talks with the Centre and the Manipur government, while the Supreme Court was subsequently informed that the blockade on NH-2 had been removed and efforts were under way to clear other highways.

Yet violence continues. And, that contradiction deserves greater attention. Opening roads is essential, but reopening highways does not by itself reopen trust between communities. A security response can suppress immediate violence, but it cannot settle competing territorial claims or erase the fear generated by months of killings and displacement.

Nor can Manipur afford to view the Naga-Kuki confrontation as a secondary conflict simply because the original Meitei-Kuki war remains unresolved. That would be a dangerous misreading.

The state is now facing multiple, overlapping fault lines. The Meitei-Kuki divide remains deeply entrenched. The Naga-Kuki confrontation has acquired its own momentum. The presence of armed groups, the porous international border, competing territorial claims and the proliferation of community-based security structures add further complexity.

The danger is of a conflict becoming multi-centred rather than merely two-sided.

That is perhaps the most important lesson from the developments of the past several months. Manipur's crisis cannot be solved by treating every fresh outbreak as an isolated law-and-order incident. Nor can it be reduced to the familiar binary of Meitei versus Kuki.

The emerging Naga-Kuki fault line demands its own political and security response — one that protects civilians irrespective of community, identifies and disarms armed groups irrespective of affiliation, restores freedom of movement and addresses the underlying territorial disputes.

Mr Biren Singh’s question about “counting bodies” therefore acquires a significance beyond the immediate killings he was referring to.

The real question for Manipur is whether the state can prevent the counting of bodies from becoming the permanent measure of its politics.

Because if the conflict continues to reproduce new ethnic fault lines, today's three-sided crisis could become tomorrow's fragmented conflict — with no single peace process capable of addressing the whole of Manipur.

The immediate priority for the Government of India must be to restore a minimum measure of order and public confidence in Manipur. That cannot be achieved through episodic security operations alone. Delhi needs a clearly defined, time-bound strategy that addresses both the security vacuum and the political vacuum.

First, the Centre must ensure that the security architecture is unified and impartial. Vulnerable areas, highways, villages and relief camps need sustained protection, while armed groups on all sides must face consistent enforcement of the law. There can be no selective application of force or tolerance of illegal blockades, extortion and weapons possession.

Second, the Centre should create a credible mechanism for sustained dialogue involving Meiteis, Kukis and Nagas, including civil society and traditional institutions. Dialogue cannot be reduced to occasional meetings in Delhi; it must address territorial anxieties, political representation, security guarantees, rehabilitation and the future of displaced people.

Third, the thousands still displaced must be treated as a central political and humanitarian priority. Safe return, compensation, reconstruction and rehabilitation require a transparent roadmap.

Finally, Delhi must confront the emerging Kuki-Naga friction before it develops into another entrenched conflict. Manipur cannot afford another fault line to get “normalised”. The objective should be simple but urgent: restore security, reopen economic lifelines, rebuild trust and create conditions in which a political settlement becomes possible.