Syed Ata Hasnain | Amid B’desh Turbulence, Risks of Disorder in East

Recent developments underline the fragility of the moment. The killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, the nationwide protests that followed, the attacks on media institutions seen as pro-India, the symbolic dismantling of Sheikh Mujib’s legacy and open anti-India sloganeering reflect a political environment driven more by emotion and identity than institutional authority. The anti-India rhetoric has become a convenient adhesive for disparate grievances, making New Delhi’s refusal to react publicly a strategically correct choice.

As experienced diplomats have long observed, external turbulence must be managed without feeding it. Street politics thrives on reaction. Responding to slogans, threats or symbolic provocation elevates fringe actors and validates their relevance. By denying adversaries an emotional response, India has tried to preserve the diplomatic space and avoided psychological escalation. This restraint has reassured regional partners and international observers that India remains a stabilising, not reactive, power.

However, abdication is the last thing India can afford. There is a critical distinction between ignoring street rhetoric and allowing sustained public haranguing of India to harden into accepted discourse. At some point, ambiguity must give way to quiet signalling. India’s red lines need not be proclaimed; they must be understood. Sanctuary to extremist groups, facilitation of narcotics or arms corridors, revival of insurgent linkages, or overt intelligence cooperation with hostile agencies would carry consequences. In such situations, a deliberate grey zone --where outcomes remain uncertain but risks are evident -- can deter more effectively than declaratory threats.

A deeper question therefore arises; did external actors misread Bangladesh? There is reason to believe that sections of the Western strategic community viewed the fall of Sheikh Hasina as a necessary disruption, driven by the assumption that order could emerge from disorder. A stable but less democratic government may have been judged less desirable than a turbulent but ostensibly more open political space. This familiar miscalculation echoes past interventions where regime change was presumed to lead to liberal realignment.

Bangladesh is not a blank slate. The assumption that Islamist political forces -- particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami -- would evolve into moderate, pro-Western actors is deeply flawed. Unlike Pakistan, where the military still exerts some restraining influence over clerical power, Bangladesh lacks a comparable institutional counterweight. Islamic radicalism there is socially embedded, politically assertive and far less amenable to external moderation. Once entrenched in governance, such forces do not merely destabilise neighbours; they export ideology.

If this trajectory persists, the global centre of gravity for Islamist radicalism could gradually shift eastward -- from Pakistan to Bangladesh. For India, this would represent a strategic nightmare; not simply a hostile neighbour, but a replication of Pakistan’s ideological threat on its eastern flank, carrying familiar risks of terrorism, demographic pressure and proxy destabilisation.

It is in this context that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence must be assessed. The ISI’s playbook in eastern India is well known; exploiting political vacuums, reconnecting dormant insurgent fragments, weaponising religion, and fusing criminal networks with ideological mobilisation. Bangladesh’s present disorder provides precisely such an opportunity. The convergence of unrest in Dhaka, the instability in Myanmar and narcotics flows into the Northeast is not coincidental.

India’s response must therefore be integrated and anticipatory. The eastern theatre -- Bangladesh, Myanmar, the Northeast and the Bay of Bengal -- must be treated as a single security ecosystem. Intelligence penetration must be strengthened, maritime surveillance quietly reinforced, and border management focused as much on facilitators and financiers as on movement itself. This demands persistence and preparedness, not public signalling.

The question of Sheikh Hasina’s extradition, demanded by Dhaka, is best addressed through calm legal and diplomatic channels, without allowing it to overshadow the larger strategic picture. India’s overriding concern lies in the direction Bangladesh is taking as a state, not in litigating individual cases in the public domain. By keeping this discreet and proportionate, New Delhi retains the space to address the more serious challenges emanating from political volatility, radical mobilisation and external manipulation in its eastern neighbourhood.

It is also necessary to acknowledge the more hawkish voices within India’s strategic discourse. Some analysts have argued for radical territorial solutions, including widening the Siliguri Corridor. These arguments arise from genuine security anxieties, particularly the vulnerability of India’s narrow land bridge to the Northeast. However, projecting such ideas in the public domain is counterproductive.

While intellectually provocative, any attempt at border revision would invite immediate international scrutiny, complicate India’s improving equation with China, and shift attention from Bangladesh’s internal failures to India’s actions. At a time when India is carefully projecting itself as a responsible power, such moves would undermine that posture. This does not preclude the examination of military contingencies, but such options must remain internal planning tools, not strategic signals.

India must neither posture as a dove nor lunge as a hawk. Strategic patience is not weakness; it preserves options. With Bangladesh moving toward elections, internal political contradictions will sharpen, giving India the space to strengthen defences without appearing coercive.

International narrative management therefore becomes critical. India must ensure that Bangladesh’s turmoil is understood globally as an internal political and ideological crisis, not as a consequence of Indian pressure or neglect. Engagement with Western capitals should be candid; destabilising a functioning state in the hope of democratic emergence carries inherent risks. New Delhi’s outreach to the Islamic world must emphasise shared concerns about the radical capture of politics. Quiet diplomacy, rather than public lecturing, will keep opinion aligned.

India’s handling of Bangladesh so far has been steady and mature. It has resisted provocation, preserved strategic space and avoided psychological escalation. The phase ahead will test that discipline. Clear but understated red lines, strengthened intelligence preparedness and careful narrative control are now required to prevent the emergence of a hostile eastern front --without firing a shot or surrendering our strategic initiative.