Pradeep C. Nair | Myanmar Reaches Out, Seeks Indian Help For Changes in Constitution Set-up

President Hliang travelled to China (June 15 to 19), signing 18 agreements across trade, infrastructure, security and technology. This should not be read as a further deepening of ties. Myanmar’s engagement with Beijing stems from the international support it gets from Beijing as well as geographic and economic dependence, rather than confidence -- reinforced further by resentment over the unpopular Myitsone Dam (originally designed to export 90 per cent of its power to China) and the Chinese-run rare-earth mining in Kachin State; Myanmar bearing the environmental costs for both, like many other Chinese projects. China’s simultaneous dealings with both the government and ethnic armed organisations deepen the unease

Update: 2026-07-30 20:19 GMT
The timing is significant; coming soon after President Min Aung Hlaing’s first foreign trip since taking office -- to India, from May 30 May to June 3. That he chose India over China, Russia or an Asean country was itself significant. The timing is significant; coming soon after President Min Aung Hlaing’s first foreign trip since taking office -- to India, from May 30 May to June 3. — File Photo

A unique gathering for a three-day lecture series on constitutionalism and federalism was witnessed in Naypyitaw, the capital of Myanmar, from July 16 to 18, organised by the country’s National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiation Committee, with support from the Indian embassy and Myanmar’s Centre for Peace and Reconciliation.

About 125 participants attended, including MPs from political parties and military officers, Union Consultative Council members, representatives of ceasefire-signatory ethnic armed organisations, government officials, civil-society experts and officials from the Indian Council of World Affairs. This followed two earlier lecture series (Naypyitaw, 2023; New Delhi, 2024) and one workshop (Yangon, 2025).

The timing is significant; coming soon after President Min Aung Hlaing’s first foreign trip since taking office -- to India, from May 30 May to June 3. That he chose India over China, Russia or an Asean country was itself significant. The composition of the President’s delegation signalled intent: the ministers of foreign affairs, finance, agriculture, industry and small enterprises, the governor of the central bank and a large business delegation spanning pharmaceuticals, banking, energy, construction, IT and trade.

The visit effectively authorised ministries, security agencies, banks and businesses on both sides to deepen ties. The President also met business leaders in Mumbai and toured the NTPC Energy Technology Research Alliance facility near Delhi. Besides, India offered Myanmar access to a vast market, strong institutions, affordable technology, and a partnership that does not threaten its sovereignty.

Later, President Hliang travelled to China (June 15 to 19), signing 18 agreements across trade, infrastructure, security and technology. This should not be read as a further deepening of ties. Myanmar’s engagement with Beijing stems from the international support it gets from Beijing as well as geographic and economic dependence, rather than confidence -- reinforced further by resentment over the unpopular Myitsone Dam (originally designed to export 90 per cent of its power to China) and the Chinese-run rare-earth mining in Kachin State; Myanmar bearing the environmental costs for both, like many other Chinese projects. China’s simultaneous dealings with both the government and ethnic armed organisations deepen the unease.

The China trip was pragmatic diplomacy, not trust -- and it took nothing away from India. By visiting India first, Myanmar signalled that it sees India as an independent, culturally close, non-extractive partner that helps it diversify away from China and preserve its autonomy.

Seen with this backdrop, the July lecture series carries weight. The NSPNC is Myanmar’s state-level body for peace negotiation and reconciliation, implementing policy set by the National Solidarity and Peace-making Central Committee. Its work spans ceasefire implementation, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement framework, dialogue with signatory and non-signatory ethnic armed organisations, talks with political parties on federalism and constitutional reform, and

humanitarian coordination in conflict areas. Four Indian speakers gave eight presentations over two days on India’s constitutional experience, its federal structure, the unitary strands within it, the powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary, democratic institutions, and constitutional amendments -- drawing strong interest and many questions. Debates ranged over centralised versus state-level power,

reflecting a familiar tension between states seeking autonomy and a centre wary of losing control.

Much attention focused on the office of governor -- its powers,

limits, and pros and cons. Myanmar’s states (home to non-Bamar communities on the periphery) and regions (the Bamar-majority heartland, 68 per cent of the population) have no such office, and Myanmar may consider creating one as a constitutional safeguard, drawing on India’s example. Under Article 261 of the 2008 Constitution, the chief minister of a state or region is chosen by the President from the local Hluttaw and remains answerable to the President, not the local

assembly. This fuses the constitutional and political-executive roles and keeps power centred nationally. Ethnic minority parties and federalists have long objected that it stops parties with local majorities from actually governing, and amending it remains a persistent issue across governments and peace talks.

There was also keen interest in Mizoram, given its border with the conflict-hit Chin State and shared kinship across it. Many wanted to understand its shift from two decades of insurgency to becoming one of India’s most peaceful, literate states -- a model that could plausibly extend to Chin and Rakhine once power passes to the Chin groups and the Arakan Army who largely control those areas today.

Myanmar remains under-studied in India and is often reduced to narrow images of military rule, insurgency, refugees, narcotics or Chinese influence. That view is inadequate. Myanmar may be the most under-rated, least understood, yet most consequential neighbour India will have in the years ahead. It is the land bridge for India’s Act East Policy, a neighbour with unusual goodwill toward India, and -- at 593 nautical miles (about 1,098 km) -- the country with which India shares its longest maritime boundary, vital to the security of the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

India needs to invest in understanding Myanmar properly: with

dedicated university programmes, more officials and researchers learning Burmese, partnerships between Northeast Indian institutions and their counterparts in Mandalay, Yangon and Naypyitaw, better market intelligence for businesses, and active involvement from academic and cultural institutions. India’s approach must combine steady government engagement with wider humanitarian and cultural contact with ethnic communities and civil society -- safeguarding its interests without appearing to interfere.

This exchange helped both sides understand each other better and marks a modest but real step forward. Myanmar’s government had reportedly been studying Swiss, American and German constitutional models closely before it; as one participant put it, the real lesson was that any future amendment to the 2008 Constitution should draw on India’s experience rather than distant ones. The two countries share much in their diverse populations and unstable border regions, a kinship that is deepened further by common culture, history and geography.


The writer is a former D-G of Assam Rifles and is currently the vice-chancellor of St. Mary’s Rehabilitation University, Hyderabad

Tags:    

Similar News