Pradeep C. Nair | How Bangladesh, Nepal & Myanmar Elections Impact India’s Northeast

The current war in the Persian Gulf has critically affected Bangladesh, which imports 95 per cent of its oil needs. Bangladesh has already introduced fuel rationing, closed a few fertiliser factories, and its garment industries are now on the verge of shutting down

Update: 2026-03-17 19:01 GMT
The election of Balendra Shah, who heads the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), reflects a youth-driven political shift, where voters have rejected most of the traditional elites who felt entitled and were grossly corrupt. — PTI

While much of the world’s attention in recent weeks has been riveted around the disruptions caused by the war in the Middle East and also around the four-year-old Russia-Ukraine war, what has gone relatively unnoticed are the recent elections in Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar; three countries that share borders with Northeast India. These elections will have far-reaching implications not only for these countries, but also for India’s Northeast region and for India’s relations with these countries. Geography will be a key determinant in shaping future relations; not the rhetoric of anti-India campaigns as was done in the recent past in Bangladesh and Nepal.

After winning a thumping electoral victory, the steps taken by the BNP under Tarique Rahman are indeed very commendable. Under him, Bangladesh has pivoted towards closer ties with India. The BNP leadership has indicated continued cooperation on regional security concerns, that include preventing insurgent groups (of the Northeast) from using Bangladesh territory (that was a key concern when the interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus reached out extensively to China and Pakistan), countering extremism and undertaking coordination on regional stability issues. The recent visit of the newly-appointed Bangladesh DGFI to India, during which time he met India’s NSA, Ajit Doval, the chief of RAW and the DGMI, clearly signal a move to rebuild ties and address mutual security concerns. The resumption of visa services (which were largely frozen while Mr Yunus was at the helm), assurance of resuming key infrastructure and connectivity projects that had been stalled, reassurance on safety of the minorities and support to energy interdependence, that includes maintaining the flow of diesel, are all very encouraging signs. Under the India-Bangladesh diesel supply pact, India annually supplies 1,80,000 tons of diesel via the Numaligarh pipeline. Bangladesh has now requested for an additional 50,000 metric tonnes of diesel from India to shore up its critically low fuel reserves. Around 5,000 tons have already arrived in Bangladesh on March 10.

The current war in the Persian Gulf has critically affected Bangladesh, which imports 95 per cent of its oil needs. Bangladesh has already introduced fuel rationing, closed a few fertiliser factories, and its garment industries are now on the verge of shutting down. The immediate oil needs of Bangladesh will obviously be met by India (not possible for China).

The winds of change in relation to India’s ties with Nepal have already begun sweeping down the Himalayas. The previous K.P. Sharma Oli government used strong nationalist rhetoric against India, often highlighting border disputes like Kalapani and Lipulekh, besides blaming India for interfering in Nepal’s domestic politics. Further, Mr Oli often sought close strategic and economic engagement with China. The election of Balendra Shah, who heads the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), reflects a youth-driven political shift, where voters have rejected most of the traditional elites who felt entitled and were grossly corrupt. On Mr Shah’s election by an overwhelming majority, India had congratulated Nepal and its citizens, besides signalling its willingness to work with the new leadership. The RSP has emphasised a policy of “balanced and dynamic diplomacy” with both India and China, emphasising on economic cooperation, cross-border connectivity and trade to convert Nepal from a “buffer state into a vibrant bridge”. This clearly reflects a more pragmatic economic and strategic engagement with India, leaving aside the ideological hostility the earlier government of K.P. Sharma Oli propagated.

Nationalist rhetoric against India no longer seems to be on the agenda and this will further boost the fact that India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. Many infrastructure projects in Nepal depend on India’s support, so does transfer of electricity from Nepal to Bangladesh via India.

In Myanmar, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which is a military-propped party, has come to power, with the government formation likely in April 2026. India was among nine countries that sent observers for the election. Besides, India is one of the very few countries which had sent a Track-2 delegation to Myanmar late last year to convey to most domestic stakeholders in Myanmar the functioning of federalism in India and important aspects of the Indian Constitution, which can be replicated in Myanmar. A likely tweaking of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar after the formation of the new government is, is therefore, likely. While many countries are questioning the legitimacy of the election and the military junta’s democratic credentials, for India, its core interests lie in engaging with the junta as well as the other stakeholders, which India is doing in any case. The importance of the Kaladan Multimodal Trade and Transit Project (KMTTP), the Sittwe port and the Trilateral Highway, for not just alternate connectivity routes to India’s Northeast, but also for the economic development of some of the most neglected areas of Myanmar (Rakhine and Chin states) cannot be overstated. The new government and the people of Myanmar will continue to view India’s engagement as mutually beneficial, unlike the Chinese engagements that smack of resource extraction, ensuring a constant state of turmoil in Myanmar (by arming the Tatmadav and the ethnic armed militias simultaneously) and a selfish aim of reaching out to the Indian Ocean to become a “Two-Ocean Power”.

While dealing with these three countries, what really works in India’s favour (as opposed to China) is geographic contiguity, characterised by porous borders (unlike the hostile mountain barriers which China shares with Nepal and Myanmar) as also shared linguistic and religious ties (greater transborder people to people linkages), besides mutually beneficial shared hydro systems (unlike the Myitsone Hydel Project in Myanmar, which exclusively benefited China and led to protests in Myanmar). All these advantages that India holds are revealed in the two seminal books on geography of our times -- The Revenge of Geography, by Robert Kaplan, and Prisoners of Geography, by Tim Marshall.

The writer is a former Assam Rifles D-G and is currently the vice-chancellor of St. Mary’s Rehabilitation University, Hyderabad

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