Pavan K Varma | The Election Commission Cannot Outsource Its Defence

There is a curious asymmetry in the political controversy surrounding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. Political parties are shouting themselves hoarse, allegations of institutional complicity are being traded with increasing vehemence, and the credibility of the electoral process is being questioned. Yet the institution at the centre of this storm, the Election Commission of India (ECI), seems strangely reluctant to engage directly with the questions being raised about its functioning.

The silence is all the more inexplicable because the allegations are not merely the partisan complaints of a disgruntled Opposition. An investigation by The Indian Express, published on September 23, 2026, reported that two of the three election commissioners (ECs), Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi, had recorded objections on at least 14 occasions over 10 months to decisions and procedures connected with the SIR. These reportedly concerned changes to Form 6, the centralisation of control over electoral-roll software, appeals against the restoration of voters’ names in West Bengal, and decisions allegedly taken without the knowledge or approval of the full Commission.

These are serious allegations. They may be explicable, but they cannot be wished away. When questions are raised about the integrity of the machinery through which the Indian citizen exercises the most fundamental right of democratic participation, the burden of explanation rests squarely on that machinery.

Instead, the ECI issued a press note on September 23, stating that the internal notes and observations were a normal part of institutional deliberation to improve the electoral processes. It also asserted that all decisions taken by the full Commission during the preceding year, including those relating to the SIR, had been unanimous. What the statement did not do was to explain who authorised the disputed change to Form 6, who approved the filing of appeals against restored voters in West Bengal, why concerns about an audit of the electoral software remained unanswered, or why the full Commission reportedly did not meet between May and August. Nor did it address the specific concerns in the internal correspondence.

A statement that asserts unanimity is not necessarily an explanation of how unanimity was reached. An assurance that procedures are sound is not a substitute for demonstrating that they are sound. And a general declaration of institutional rectitude cannot answer specific questions about institutional conduct.

It is imperative, therefore, for the Commission to convene a press conference at which all three commissioners are present. They should answer questions directly, explain the relevant decisions and procedures, disclose what records can lawfully be made public, and clarify how the objections raised by two of their colleagues were considered and resolved. If the allegations are unfounded, the Commission has every reason to rebut them comprehensively. If there were procedural lapses, acknowledging and correcting them would demonstrate institutional maturity, not weakness. An independent constitutional institution must possess the confidence to speak in its own voice.

The BJP is entitled to defend the Commission. It is entitled to contest allegations of electoral manipulation and to point out that electoral rolls must be cleansed of duplicate, deceased and otherwise ineligible entries. No serious democracy can object to the legitimate objective of accurate electoral rolls. But there is a distinction between defending the principle of electoral integrity and appearing to speak on behalf of the institution responsible for upholding it.

Every time the ruling party rushes to defend the ECI, it risks reinforcing the very perception it wishes to dispel: that the Commission and the government are politically aligned. The BJP has won elections and lost elections. It must expect to remain a participant in both possibilities. Its long-term interest, therefore, lies not in having an Election Commission perceived as sympathetic to the government of the day, but in having one whose impartiality is beyond reasonable suspicion. The same principle applies to every political party.

All political parties must also ensure that there is optimal confidence in the manner in which ECs are appointed. Article 324(2) of the Constitution provides for the appointment of the chief election commissioner and other election commissioners by the President, subject to parliamentary legislation. For more than seven decades, Parliament did not enact a law establishing a comprehensive selection procedure.

On March 2, 2023, in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court addressed this legislative vacuum. It directed that, until Parliament made a law, appointments should be recommended by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India. The objective was to provide a measure of institutional balance in the selection of those entrusted with supervising the democratic process.

Parliament subsequently enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. The law replaced the Chief Justice with a Union Cabinet minister nominated by the Prime Minister. The selection committee now comprises the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and the nominated Cabinet Minister. The Supreme Court declined to stay the new law in March 2024 while challenges to its constitutionality remained pending. In September 2026, a Supreme Court bench referred the challenge to the Chief Justice for consideration of a Constitution Bench.

The significance of this change should not be understated. With the Prime Minister and a minister nominated by him forming two members of the three-person committee, the government effectively commands a majority in the selection process. The argument is not that the Chief Justice is infallible, or that judicial participation guarantees perfect appointments. The argument is that the selection of an independent constitutional authority should not be structured to give the government of the day an effective numerical advantage.

Democracy is imperilled when the institutions responsible for protecting the vote cease to command public trust. This is why the present controversy must not be reduced to a contest between the BJP and the Opposition. The ECI does not belong to the BJP. It does not belong to the Opposition. It must speak for itself, and not outsource its defence to the ruling party. India's democracy deserves nothing less.