K.C. Singh | Pak-Saudi-Turkish Pact A Fresh Challenge For India

On August 7, 2026, a trilateral mutual defence agreement was signed between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in Mecca. The venue, which has Islam’s holiest mosque, symbolises a convergence of three powerful Islamic nations. The mutual defence clause reflects Article 5 of the Nato agreement. Though Egypt had joined the negotiations earlier, it kept away. Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidann, expects it to join soon. Turkish leaders emphasised that the agreement was not aimed at any country and was a purely defensive measure.

Though not a “Middle Eastern Nato”, some term it the “Islamic Nato”. Members of Nato had shared concerns about countering the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. In fact, their joining the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan went beyond the original mandate. Also, Nato countries have a joint command and control syatem and a shared nuclear deterrence, though the US retains the control of forward-deployed nuclear weapons.

The three Mecca agreement nations have some, not totally, overlapping threat concerns. Turkey has had differences with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even declared that “our next target is Turkey”. Consequently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that “now you can’t even touch our hair”. Turkey has berated Israeli military intrusions into Lebanon and pressure on the Syrian regime, which Turkey helped install. Turkey’s relations with Iran have fluctuated. But they share an interest in containing the aspirations of the Kurdish community which dominates eastern Turkey, the northern parts of Syria and Iraq as well as western Iran. Reportedly, Turkey restrained Israel from employing Iraqi Kurds for a ground operation against Iran, co-opting Iran’s Kurdish minority, at the start of the US-Israeli war.

Ironically, the Turkish Ottoman Empire, after recapturing Diriyah, the first Saudi state, in 1818, took the al-Saud family ruler and his sons prisoner. They were beheaded in Istanbul, then Constantinople, in 1818. Recent Saudi-Turkish differences first arose over Turkey supporting the Arab Spring in 2010-11. Then came the brutal killing of American journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Now the shared threats eclipse the past differences.

Saudi Arabia basically perceives a threat from Iran and its allies like Yemen’s Houthis and Iraq’s pro-Iran militias. Yemen has had a truce since 2022, but recently the Houthis targeted Saudi Arabia’s Aramco oil facility. Regarding Israel, the Saudis have resisted US pressure to sign the 2020 Abraham Accords and normalise relations, demanding that Israel must first present a pathway to a Palestinian state. In fact, the Saudis hurriedly signed a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan in September 2025, days after Israel targeted Hamas in Qatar, which created a perception of the US being unable or unwilling to control Israel targeting the GCC countries. However, the US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28 triggered the Iranian retaliation on US military bases and assets in the GCC nations. Thus, the present Mecca agreement covers Saudi Arabia’s perceived threats from both Israel and Iran plus its allies.

Pakistan presents a different case. Since independence, it has repeatedly tried grabbing the India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir by force or multilateral UN intervention or terrorism-based blackmail. After 1947, while India chose nonalignment during the Cold War, Pakistan accepted military alliances with the US and Britain. In 1954, it signed the mutual defence assistance agreement with the US for obtaining military assistance in exchange for an anti-Communist posture.

The new Air Force aircraft and the Army’s tanks gave Pakistan a military advantage over India, which instead was focused on development and not strengthening its defence forces. China militarily defeating India in 1962 and the 1964 death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru left the Indian defence forces demoralised and under-equipped. Perceiving Indian vulnerability, Pakistan tried in 1965 to militarily grab Kashmir, but failed.

The military alliance with the United States slowly weakened after Pakistan declined to send troops to assist America during the Vietnam War. It eventually collapsed after India won the 1971 war, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistan since then has aligned with China as both countries want to contain India while keeping their outstanding disputes alive. In between, Pakistan again became the military spearhead of the US-Saudi countering of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

In the new trilateral arrangement, the Saudis bring oil wealth and religious standing; Turks contribute a modern army and weapons compliant with Nato standards; and Pakistan represents the only Islamic nation possessing nuclear weapons. But the “mutual defence” commitment has limits. Iran’s recent targeting of Saudi Arabia, over the existence of US military bases on its soil, saw Pakistan continuing to play the mediator without threatening Iran with retaliation.

Similarly, in Pakistan’s standoff with the Afghan Taliban regime, the Saudis have maintained neutrality, perhaps helping financially or by military supplies.

How does the Mecca agreement impinge on Indian interests? Firstly, the Indian policy of military retaliation for Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in India requires reassessment. The Iran war has demonstrated the failure of US airstrikes to intimidate Iran. The 2025 Operation Sindoor was an enhanced version of the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. And yet, Pakistan was not deterred. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are unlikely to openly join Pakistan if India undertakes such an operation again.

Though in the past, Turkey had supplied advanced drones to Pakistan, both may now openly transfer arms.

But between US President Donald Trump’s pampering of Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership, Pakistan’s Iran war mediation and now the Mecca agreement, both the global and the regional diplomatic standing of Pakistan has risen. Closer engagement between the defence industries of Pakistan and Turkey, with Saudi financial backing and Chinese technological assistance, could present India with a stronger and economically revived antagonist. Persisting with non-dialogue with Islamabad, as even the RSS has argued, is a fairly poor diplomatic strategy.

Two other factors are relevant. First, the Mecca agreement allows China to market its weapons in the Gulf, using Pakistan. Reportedly, Pakistan has already sent Chinese F-17 fighter planes and other systems to Saudi Arabia after the September 2025 defence deal. Second, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s extensive diplomacy to woo the Gulf ruling families now faces a split within the GCC, with Pakistan selectively regaining influence.

Clearly, the Indian government’s alignment with the US-Israel-UAE axis and Mr Modi’s continuing personalised engagement with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has become quite counter-productive. Add the BJP’s domestic majoritarianism, and an opportunity arises for Pakistan’s influence to resurrect in the Gulf and important Islamic nations, while shrinking the strategic space for New Delhi.