Gurjit Singh | ‘Act East’ 2026: Strategic Rejig In A Turbulent World

Significant trends are occurring in India’s diplomatic approach to the Indo-Pacific. If you see one visit at a time, you may miss the strategic significance of the overall trajectory that India seeks in the face of unstable crisis situations, as well as the approaches of China and the United States to the region.

The annual summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese PM Sanai Takaichi, now to be held in New Delhi from July 1, should be seen alongside Mr Modi’s return visits to Indonesia and Australia and the first visit by an Indian PM to New Zealand in 40 years.

These four engagements collectively present more than a busy schedule of diplomatic visits. They are an elaboration of India’s “Act East” policy.

This emerges from the evident realities of an unstable order, in which India seeks greater stability in the Indo-Pacific. Twelve years after the launch of the AEP, its logic has been accepted, and it has shown sufficient flexibility to address contextual changes in the region.

The US-led liberal order, stable global supply chains, and the role of multilateral institutions have diminished at a speed and in a manner that was incomprehensible even when Covid-19 struck. The disruption of supply chains caused by Covid, the Ukraine and Iran crises was accentuated by Trump 2.0’s harsh trade attitudes towards friends.

The Trump administration’s approach to seeking a “G-2” with China, acknowledging its rise and pivoting away from the Indo-Pacific in a strategic sense, gives India, Japan, Australia and Asean much to think about regarding their future trajectories. This transition is neither minuscule nor temporary.

Australia and Japan have felt the obliteration of the distinction between partners and rivals, as has India. Despite efforts, tariff issues remain paramount, unsettling the institutional frameworks that guided the Indo-Pacific for a while.

In this, Mr Modi’s Indo-Pacific engagements with partners are timely. India is no longer waiting for Washington to show enthusiasm. Instead, India is building on its own partnerships, economic architecture, and supply chain expectations at a faster pace than anticipated.

The Japan PM’s visit remains the core of this strategy now. The presence of nearly 200 businessmen from about 100 companies underscores the Japanese preference for economic security as the core of the partnership. Investment, resilient supply chains and enhanced interaction on semiconductors, renewable energy, EVs, defence electronics, critical minerals and an expanded automobile partnership will buttress this relationship.

Japan was committed to doubling its investment between 2022 and 2027 to 5 trillion yen. Since 2025, it has enhanced its target to 10 trillion yen by 2035.

The continuum established by annual summits aligns India’s Act East policy and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision. This bilateral engagement is likely to intensify, allowing it to influence and bolster the Quad and other regional initiatives that are being diminished by the lack of American enthusiasm.

If India, Japan and Australia can rekindle the India-Japan-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, it will show good momentum among themselves. It could very well be the institutionalized manifestation of a common understanding that none of the partners can have their critical supply chains run through China as a major hub, whose ability to create vulnerabilities in our supply chains is evident.

Mr Modi’s three-nation tour of Jakarta, Australia and New Zealand will present a regional picture of engagement as well.

In Jakarta, the Modi-Prabowo talks will follow up on Mr Prabowo’s Republic Day visit in 2025. Maritime security, defence cooperation, enhanced trade and supply chain development will be important, besides people-to-people and educational linkages. Indonesia could finalize its order for the BrahMos missile systems, which have taken long to fructify. Bilateral trade, currently at $25 billion, can easily reach its $50 billion target with better market access.

Greater avenues of cooperation in health, tourism and military exercises could bring Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelago, which is close to the important Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda, and become a strategic partner in the growing Indian interest in the area, as seen in the Great Nicobar project emerging soon. Closer strategic alignment between India and Indonesia needs to be kindled in a way that advances essential goals, and Mr Modi’s visit is likely to do so.

To New Zealand, Mr Modi’s visit will be the first by an Indian PM in 40 years. It comes soon after India and New Zealand concluded an FTA that removes tariffs on Indian exports while reducing duties on most of New Zealand’s exports.

The symbolism here is manifest. India is covering the gaps in its high-level visits to friendly countries at a rapid pace.

With Australia, the engagement is a mature partnership. Prime Ministers Modi and Albanese have met frequently at various international summits and maintain a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, supported by agreements on mobility, renewable energy and enhanced engagement.

India is elected as the vice-chair of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Supply Chain Council, which the countries of the region intend to carry on, even if US interest wanes. India will gain in the Indo-Pacific by participating more fully in the IPEF arrangements, and its recognition as an important partner for resilient supply chains would be immediate. Applying for the CPTPP will provide a boost to the AEP as India is thinking beyond market access issues and posits itself as a stable partner in a region that requires greater trust.

While critical minerals are an important area of development, and the Quad committed about $20 billion towards developing supply chains across the Indo-Pacific, it is time for India, Australia, Japan and Indonesia to look at developing alternative supply chains among themselves, because they provide the technology, the capital, the supply sources, and downstream opportunities.

Among these visits, India’s role as a link between the rising powers of the Global South and the established powers that contribute to global instability emerges. It is a proper appreciation of India’s position in the region, where China remains assertive, and the United States increasingly unpredictable, with conflicts disturbing fertiliser, food and energy supply routes.

India’s visibility as a partner of scale, stability, and strategic autonomy opens the door to collaboration with many existing and potential partners by extending trust-based diplomacy.

In 2026, the Act East policy is not merely looking to the East. It is the way in which India’s development priorities are being presented to repair a damaged global order, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

In the weeks ahead, how India pursues its Act East policy will be determinants of future collaborations in the Indo-Pacific, without necessarily prompting the US to participate.

Gurjit Singh is a retired diplomat, who has served as India’s ambassador to Indonesia and Germany, and is the author of The Durian Flavour