Abhijit Bhattacharyya | Has The Tank A Future In 21st Century Land Wars?

Let it be known that each and every bit of information on military hardware is gleaned from open-source publications of international repute and credibility for more than five decades, like annual armament and tech journals Jane’s Armour & Artillery, Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms 2026-2027, Jane’s Infantry Weapons and Jane’s World Armies 2025; besides Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Military Balance of International Institute for Strategic Studies 2026 (IISS), London.

In 2010, one wrote, “Has the tank a future?” It’s time to revisit the issue owing to the latest scenario unfolding across battlefields with ripples felt by all main battle tank (MBT) stake holders, from producer and seller to user. Today the issue needs fresh analysis and reassessment in light of several land wars and experience gained from loss, failures and success in the 21st century.

In 2010, one wrote that “the MBT continues to adorn the stage and inventory of virtually all major armies of the world and produced by 31 countries”. And “out of 166 nations’ armed forces, except 41, rest 125 user-states had various types of MBTs in their military inventories”. Nevertheless, the main producer-cum-distributers to the 2010 arms bazaar numbered five only, viz., France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US, notwithstanding the machine being produced by a total of 31 countries.

Today, the number of actual indigenous MBT producers has dwindled to just 14: the US, Russia, China, Germany, North Korea, South Korea, France, UK, Japan, India, Iran, Israel, Turkey and Pakistan. And some traditional manufacturers like Italy and Spain have switched over to joint ventures with German and American tank makers, respectively. Poland and Romania, too, have gone for US-made Abrams and South Korea’s K2 MBT and Egypt co-assembling American M1 Abrams. Why? Is it owing to threat perception calculation and economics? Not exactly, the major reason is shrinking industrial base resulting from high-cost production preceded by equally high, if not higher research and development economics.

Be that as it may, Military Balance 2026 IISS, London, shows that out of the armed forces of 173 countries, 110 have MBTs and 63 countries do not have a single tank. Hence, the increasing numbers of MBTs in some countries’ land forces do reconfirm the faith in MBT to play a decisive role in battlefields. The conventional belief and thinking that the MBT can be of use in high-intensity military operations like the epic tank battles in western Europe and protracted wars of attrition resulting in colossal loss of men and machines inside Russia where the weather god turned to be one of the principal players in destroying the marauding tank armada of Hitler, the Fuehrer of the Third Reich, in 1941-1944 is still alive.

The question, therefore, comes back to the possible reason behind this undying infatuation for MBT in militaries across the globe. Can the MBT still be “invincible” and “impenetrable” owing to its “mobility, fire power and protection” in comparison to other fighting units of an army? Not exactly, as 20th century warfare clearly shows. While technically and theoretically, the MBT has been an extremely attractive, imposing and formidable proposition, it has nevertheless posted a performance of mixed fortunes in World War 2. All MBTs do have the main gun (105 mm to 125 mm rifled or smoothbore) with a fiery long barrel protruding out of the turret, capable of firing between 35 to 50 lethal shells along with a co-axial machine gun and a turret-mounted 7.62 or 12.7 mm gun, but anyone hoping to make an outright victory out of a standalone tank-versus-tank battle would do well to closely relook at three conflicts of the 21st century, Afghanistan, Iraq and Ukraine, when engaging in long-term perspective planning for the countries concerned.

Thus, US invasions of Afghanistan, lasting 20 years from 2001 to 2021, and the eight-year (2003-2011) occupation of Iraq beginning 2003 with typical aggression of the Western country’s need and greed for resources, camouflaged under politico-diplomatic sloganeering, saw American MBTs in action.

The two-decade Afghan story needs no reminder. The US fought a protracted battle against vastly inferior quality ammo used first by Kabul and then by Baghdad. “Human bombers” constituted the most formidable threat to America, and they considered its troops as adversaries hailing from an opulent but distant land.

In Iraq, the US MBT had better luck owing to a smoother urban terrain. It faced ambush, suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices but still came out relatively unscathed. Americans faced a situation akin to a 65-ton heavy-weight Israeli Merkava MBT dealing with urban non-Israeli adversaries in Gaza, West Bank and densely populated Levant land.

The myth of the MBT as the ultimate strategic weapon in land war was, however, burst in the ongoing 55-month Russia-Ukraine conflict on vast open terrain. The entire manual of tank warfare, written by Captain Basil Liddell Hart to Major Gen. J.F.C. Fuller’s “massed armoured formations” today are under scrutiny owing to high casualty and endless bloodshed in Europe. The “first person view” (FPV) kamikaze drones, “top attack” javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), concentrated long-range artillery fire and dense minefields have literally torn away the MBT’s aura of invincibility as a mass formation, mobile, fire-spitting fortress.

The tank isn’t dead, yet it’s not as alive and kicking as in the past. The Ukraine war has changed the MBT’s path from Hitler’s blitzkrieg cutting through the western front, the Maginot Line and the Siegfried Line to bring about the 1940 “Fall of Paris” to Russia’s inability to make it a 2022 “Fall of Kiev”. The feat of the Panzer MBT of 1940 could not be repeated by the T-90 tank of 2026.

What then is future of the MBT? Let’s be real. The days of June 1941 Operation Barbarossa have gone when the triad armies of German commanders Bock, Leeb and Rundstedt could advance more than 100 kilometres a day through Soviet land. Today the MBT needs high-tech camouflage, rapid dispersal (not high concentration), fast change of location, position, course and direction and long range “outgunning” capability, matching with co-ordinated firing acumen of artillery guns.

True, the MBT is still there owing to its unmatched firepower, mobility and armour compared to all other land platforms. Nevertheless, it needs to discard its idea of “exclusiveness” based on past glory. The MBT has to move on, and rely on, “combined arms of joint-ness” formation. It has to be integrated with electronic warfare, infantry, offensive/defensive drone units and seamless logistics to maintain its utility as a weapon capable of seizing or holding ground.

The MBT is alive but it needs a complete reorientation of its operation manual with brand new syllabus. The conventional, sand-model, orthodox tank commander has to dismount from the ceremonial parade formation where it once led the pageantry of the nation. Ukraine has transformed the MBT into an important tactical arm to remind all stake holders that it’s not the sole strategic system per se. Just as an aircraft carrier cannot sustain all by itself its role as the sole marauder of the sea, the MBT, too, needs a whole ecosystem backed by the unified army of the state.