Decoding 1962 rout: Where the generals went wrong

According to war veteran Gen. B.M. Kaul, there were several tactical and logistical reasons for our failure in October-November 1962... Little attempt was made by the Indian Army, at any level, to study the Chinese tactics or how to counter them

During the recently- held celebrations of 50th anniversary of 1965 Indo-Pak war, an ageing retired colonel strongly objected to a panelist describing the 1962 conflict with China as a “humiliating defeat”. He argued that the soldiers fought bravely and Generals like B.M. Kaul, contrary to public perception, provided the best possible military leadership in a difficult situation that the country found itself as a result of China’s betrayal of India.

The veteran’s intervention in the two-day seminar, held at Manekshaw auditorium in the first week of September, reminded one of Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech in Parliament in August 1963, quoted by Gen. Kaul in his book The Untold story. Nehru announced in the Lok Sabha in August 1963 that no Army Generals could be blamed for the military reverses against the Chinese in 1962. Nehru also wrote on 22 December 1962, in his monthly letter to the chief ministers, that it was an honourble gesture on the part of Generals Thapar and Kaul to have voluntarily retired from the Army. That was Nehru at his magnanimous best. A good leader takes all the blame himself while absolving his subordinates of their lapses. But the Generals thought otherwise. They blamed each other besides, of course, flaying the political leadership, especially the temperamental Krishna Menon who was replaced as the defence minister by Y.B. Chavan even before the war ended.

It was a sad end to a brilliant career full of hardships and unparalleled services rendered in the colonial capital for the cause of India’s freedom.

According to Gen. Kaul, there were several tactical and logistical reasons for our failure in October-November 1962. Although the Indian and Chinese armies had been confronting each other along our borders for some years, with possibilities of war between them, little attempt was made by the Indian Army at any level to study seriously or practice the Chinese tactics or how to counter them, nor to understand their political and military behavior. There was also lack of inter service co-ordination at various levels.

After the failure of his talks with Chou-en-lai, in 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, through the defence minister and COAS, issued fresh directions to our forces in Ladakh and NEFA. They were asked to patrol as far forward as possible from their existing positions towards the international border. He had done so earlier in 1959 as well after the Chinese had intensified their activities in both the sectors. The COAS (Gen. Thapar), on May 6, 1962, had assured the Prime Minister that in the event of the Chinese taking aggressive action against our posts in the Aksai Chin area, we might be in a position to take retaliatory measures by capturing the Chinese Spanggur post as we were numerically superior to them in the Chushul area.

On September 12, the Government ordered the eviction of the Chinese from Dhola in NEFA. Both Lt. Gen Umrao Singh, 33 Corps Commander, and Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, four Division Commander, declared the task as beyond the capacity of the troops at their disposal, in view of logistical difficulties, inadequate build-up of supplies and equipment and deficient fire support, as compared with the high state of preparedness of the Chinese, on the other side. Prasad was replaced by Maj. Gen. A. S. Pathania, MVC, MC. D.R. Mankekar, author of the Guilty Men of 1962 writes: “In a discussion with me Pathania himself denied that the enemy had numerical superiority in this battle. He said that in numbers the two sides were equally matched, as there was a division on each side. The Chinese came to Tse la with a brigade plus. We too had a brigade in Tse la, a brigade in Bomdi la, and one weak brigade at the Divisional HQ at Dirong Zong.

The GOC, however, conceded that he had ammunition for three days and rations for six das at Tse la when the Chinese attacked.”

Disruption of the chain of command was another cause of discontent and confusion. There were occasions when the Army HQ tried to run even brigades and battalions directly on its own, bypassing the Command headquarters. For example, early in September, the Army HQ from New Delhi directly ordered Lt. Col. Misra, the battalion commander in Dhola, to capture the area Thag la-Yam la-Karpo la by September 19. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the divisional commander, protested against the order being issued over his head. The various commanders at brigade, divisional, corps and Army level were found at cross purposes with each other. A.S Pathania took over from Niranjan Prasad the command of the 4th Infantry Division, while Umrao Singh, Commander of 33 Corps, was pushed out of the fighting front, along with his corps, to make room for Kaul’s 4 Corps. Kaul said Pathania lost his nerve and held him solely responsible for the Tse la debacle.

According to Brig. J.P. Dalvi, author of Himalayan Blunder a striking example of the incongruity that underlined the psychological unpreparedness among the army officer-ranks was the report that mess silver, carpets and commodes were carried forward to the divisional headquarters in the Kameng sector. An urgent request for the immediate dispatch of a Gurkha battalion to the Dhola area to help deal with the investing Chinese force was rejected by the Eastern Command because it would interfere with the Dussehra celebrations.

Formations were deployed for years without being relieved for periodic training camps. In April 1962, a half-hearted attempt was made to hold an “exercise with troops” but nothing came of it. When war came in 1962, Brig. Dalvi’s 7 Infantry Brigade, which wore the brunt of the attack, had never carried out a single manoeuvre since it had been exercised in the plains of the Punjab, in early 1959. The infantry battalions had not had a chance to fire weapons. Under these circumstances, no formation has the slightest chance of survival in war, against a first-class land power. The troops we rushed from the Punjab were largely ineffective as they were lost in the mountains.

Brig. Dalvi writes: “The blame for this state of affairs lies with the General Staff, the Army Commander and the formation commanders, including myself, who accepted command of troops who were not ready, and who were not allowed to get ready for war. Senior commanders were content to accept an ‘operational role’ without any theoretical or practical experience of operating against the Chinese.” Gen. Chaudhari, who took over as COAS from Thappar, held Kaul responsible for the NEFA debacle which was the consequence of the latter’s defective planning , mixed up priorities and over-confidence.

The complaint against Gen. Kaul as corps commander was that he was seldom available at the corps HQ for directions and consultations. He was most of the time away in the forward areas not allowing junior commanders freedom of action.

The Opposition parties must also share the blame for keeping the country unprepared to defend itself against the Chinese aggression.

Indeed, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, who had turned out to be the most bitter critic of Nehru’s China policy, sang a different tune until 1959. The staunch Gandhian that he was, speaking on the Defence Budget in the Lok Sabha in 1957, Mr Kriplani declared: “The mounting expenses on the Army should be cut down. The followers of Gandhi and adherents of universal peace should not increase military expenses. Otherwise, their pretensions would be hypocritical.”

Nobody, more than finance minister Morarji Desai, who was always at loggerheads with Krishna Menon, agreed with Mr Kriplani and many of his “Gandhian” colleagues in Parliament. However, there was a silver lining. Thanks to Nehru’s non-alignment, which brought instant supply of crucial arms and equipment from both the eastern and western blocks, and Chavan’s dynamism, the country was militarily well prepared by 1965. For Shastri, and the country, 1962 debacle, therefore, came as a blessing in disguise.

The writer is an ex-Army officer and a member of the National Commission for Minorities. The views expressed by him are personal.