Dragon-baiting dangers

Even nearly 54 years after its humiliating military defeat at the hands of China, India clearly is in no mood to risk another conflict. While defence experts point out that war between the two nuclear-armed Asian giants is not an option, the more realistic worry is a localised skirmish that could test the nerves of both sides. With a belligerent and hostile Pakistan Army on its western front, India will have to weigh the costs of opening another front on its east. The Indian security establishment has been grappling with the nightmarish possibility of a two-front war that India could face in future, a euphemism for a joint Sino-Pakistani military attack on India.

But even on its own, the 2.3 million-strong Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which enjoys a considerable numerical superiority, packs in quite a punch and India will clearly have to punch much above its weight if it is ever locked in a conflict situation with the Chinese dragon. The reasons are not far to seek. The 1.2 million-strong Indian Army has not acquired modern artillery guns for nearly three decades now, the last artillery acquisition being the Bofors guns in the late 1980s. Plans to acquire ultra-light howitzer (ULH) artillery guns, ideal for mountain warfare and to have been deployed in the eastern sector facing China, have yet to see the light of day. The Indian Army currently has about 6,400 battle tanks, far less than the 9,100 that China has. The Indian Navy is suffering from a critical shortage of submarines and has about 15 currently, at a time when China has 68 of these. The Indian Air Force (IAF) also desperately wants induction of modern fighter aircraft, especially the multi-role medium combat aircraft (MMRCA) to boost the number of its fighter squadrons. The IAF has about 650 fighter aircraft while the Chinese have about 1,200 of these. Plans to build border roads in the eastern sector have been delayed by years.

Establishment of a mountain strike corps of the Army in the eastern sector, already underway, will be completed only by 2021 amid reports that the process of its raising may be hit by a lack of adequate financial resources. The mountain strike corps was envisaged to give the Indian Army offensive capabilities vis-a-vis China for the very first time, considering that the Army has traditionally adopted a defensive posture on that sector following its defeat in 1962.

“Conflict is always a possibility if diplomacy fails. But there are always warnings and an escalatory ladder. Nothing happens overnight. The world is not going to let the escalatory ladder hit the pinnacle,” points out former Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. (retd.) B.S. Jaswal who, as Northern Command chief, was refused a visa to visit China in 2010. “A possibility of a low-cost, high pay-off skirmish in eastern Ladakh cannot be ruled out in future,” he says. “For India, war is not an option, war-avoidance is. The Chinese have a distinct military advantage if there is a conflict, but it will not be a 1962-like situation. The military costs that India will impose on the aggressor will make it difficult for the Chinese. It will not be a cakewalk for them,” he believes. The former Northern Army Commander also points out that for India to adequately protect itself, there needs to be not just one but two mountain strike corps. While the current mountain strike corps being raised is primarily meant to bolster the eastern sector, he says, the other one should be positioned on the western sector. “We don’t have enough strike and offensive elements,” he concedes. Defence experts also caution against a lightning thrust and localised skirmish in J&K’s eastern Ladakh (the northern sector) by the Chinese to demoralise the Indian Army and test its nerves, saying the failures of 1962 must never be repeated.

A Parliamentary Defence Standing Committee report tabled last year had shockingly revealed, “The Committee is dismayed to note that in Tawang (Arunachal) area (the eastern sector) the situation is very critical in so far as connectivity is concerned. In case of war, the Army cannot reach there in a day. While our neighbouring countries (a clear reference to China) can reach the borders within two or three hours, our Army takes more than a day to reach there. This is a matter of great concern with regard to our Defence Preparedness.” About 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China as its own territory and the Chinese are almost certainly expected to mount a sharp attack on Tawang in case a conflict ever breaks out again.

In another major admission that caused much alarm, the IAF recently said it simply did not have adequate fighter aircraft to launch a full-fledged air campaign in case of a two-front war, a euphemism for the theoretical possibility of a simultaneous Sino-Pakistani attack on India. The sanctioned numerical strength of the IAF fighter aircraft squadrons should be 42 but currently it is only 33. IAF Vice-Chief Air Marshal B.S. Dhanoa — who is likely to be India's next IAF chief eventually — said, “Our numbers are not adequate to fully execute an air campaign in a two-front scenario... Are the numbers adequate No. The squadrons are winding down. We have given our concerns to the government. The government is seized of this problem...”

When asked about the increasing Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) sorties over the Tibet region bordering India, IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha too had admitted last year that the Chinese PLAAF presence in that area was increasing “exponentially”. No doubt, an indication of Chinese military preparedness that India has much to learn from.