Book Review | Did Zardari Fail 26/11 test?
The book, an empathetic assessment by an insider, describes the Pakistani Army’s ability to shape Pakistani politics, court verdicts or foreign policy
The Zardari Presidency, written by Bhutto family’s media adviser Farhatullah Babar, illustrates the functioning of Pakistan’s highest office. In particular, it examines the behind-the-scenes relationship between Pakistani military and political leadership, including the highest office holders. The judiciary too figures in a three-way power struggle.
It has 10 sections, with multiple very short chapters. The first Zardari presidency was from 2008 to 2013. His shrewd ejection from the presidency of President Pervez Musharraf and then grabbing it is quite a story. The writer, had been media adviser and trusted aide to Zardari’s late wife and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. He confesses never having thought Zardari could outgrow his entitlement-based past, laden with corruption and power abuse charges. His reelection for a second term as President in 2024, after a hiatus of 11 years, confirms Zardari’s political savviness.
Three major events during Zardari’s presidency tested his political skills. Assuming office on September 9, 2008, while engaging newsmen, he hinted at initiatives to improve relations with India. He even invited Afghan President Hamid Karzai for his swearing-in, despite tense Pak-Afghan relations. However, weeks later Pakistani terrorists, belonging to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, launched brutal attacks in Mumbai on November 26, called the 26/11 attacks. The book avoids examining that episode, including why President Zardari fell silent after proposing coordination between the Pakistani and Indian investigating agencies.
The writer does argue that Zardari missed two opportunities “to revamp the security and intelligence apparatus”. These were the 26/11 Mumbai attack and the May 2, 2011, killing of Osama bin Laden near the Abbottabad military cantonment. Pakistan’s Army initially failed to explain how bin Laden, could live there for many years undetected. It indicated a gross failure of intelligence or connivance by the Pakistani Army elements. The writer feels that President Zardari could have used these two opportunities to control ISI’s role and impose civilian oversight.
The Pakistani Army instead retaliated by encouraging, if not devising, the Memogate conspiracy. It was alleged that Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, handed a memo to one Mansoor Ijaz for onward transmission to US Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullin. Haqqani denied any such memo existed. A memo figures in the book and has interesting elements. It seeks US intervention to stymie a planned military coup in Pakistan to punish the civilian government over bin Laden killing. Consequently, peace and stability can be brought to South Asia.
In December 2011, Zardari faced a medical emergency. He resisted being moved to a military hospital, preferring treatment in Dubai. After medical treatment and some rest at his Dubai house, Zardari surprised his political rivals and the Army by returning and resuming work as President. Eventually he not only completed his term but ensured fresh parliamentary elections. Amongst his achievements was transferring power, vested in his office by military dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf, back to the Parliament.
The book, an empathetic assessment by an insider, describes the Pakistani Army’s ability to shape Pakistani politics, court verdicts or foreign policy. That may already be known, but human drama and ego clashes make the book interesting reading.
The Zardari Presidency (2008-13): Now It Must Be Told
By Farhatullah Babar
Rupa
pp. 536; Rs 995