:: Opinion

US war in Afghan vital for India too

By Shankar Roychowdhury

Oct 06 : "This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity — to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies... If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting... this is fundamental to the defence of our people".

US President Barack Obama, by no means an "imperialist warmonger", thus addressed the Veterans of Foreign Wars earlier this year with reference to "Operation Enduring Freedom", the American military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Left unspoken was the implication that the "war of choice" that his predecessor George W. Bush had initiated in Iraq had been unnecessary to begin with, and subsequently turned out to be unwise as well. Launched in the backlash of 9/11 as a quick reaction manhunt in the best traditions of Texas folklore to "Get Osama — dead or alive", the American campaign in Afghanistan foot-faulted primarily because of national-level misdirection by President George W. Bush and his advisers, Messrs Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, who accorded priority to "their" war in Iraq over the original point of main effort in Afghanistan. The concurrent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were a violation of the most basic principle of war — "selection and maintenance of aim" — which advises focusing on "one war at a time" because the sole superpower is actually no longer capable of handling more, and the United States has been paying for the blunders of its neocon leadership ever since (830 killed as on date in Afghanistan, 4,251 in Iraq).

Though events went as expected in the initial stages of both conflicts, the real wars in both instances cropped up as violent insurgencies in what had been traditionally considered the post-conflict phase, hitherto a mere formality of mopping up, putting up "mission accomplished" banners and moving out (or staying on!). As a result, the war in Afghanistan was perhaps lost in its very initial months when skeleton US forces working with unreliable local mercenaries failed to prevent the escape of Osama bin Laden from encirclement in the Tora Bora mountains to sanctuary in the Fata (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) area of Pakistan in December 2001, where he is reported to be living ever since.

The wars have dragged on since, with mounting American casualties, drawing inevitable parallels with Vietnam, which the Obama administration (like others before them) have been quick to dismiss, and reiterate their determination "to stay the course". But he has an election to face in a few years, and Afghanistan, historically reputed as the graveyard of empires, is proving a difficult war, even for the United States.

Those in charge of running it in Washington are fully aware that it may well be ultimately unwinnable largely because of a flawed strategy that leans heavily on support from Pakistan, a totally unreliable partner, with little compunctions in brazenly selling their patrons down the river.

In India, successive governments as well as public opinion in general (apart from those prone to knee-jerk anti-Americanism) have always been more comfortable with the American presence in Afghanistan than with the Iraq issue due to the perception that Afghanistan was actually something which India would have itself liked to undertake in the aftermath of the Kandahar hijack episode in 1999 but could only fret impotently as the task was far beyond its international clout and military capabilities. So now that the United States has in effect taken on the war India wanted to but could not fight, what should be India’s view of the US action in that country? One thing is sure — with all its shortcomings and flaws, a friendly regime in Afghanistan is vital to India’s national interests and if the United States considers that left to itself Afghanistan would relapse into a freehold sanctuary for jihadi terrorists capable of threatening the United States over 10,000 miles away, what should India’s perceptions be — as a far softer and much more easily accessible target?

Is Afghanistan in many ways a "war of necessity" for India too? And if so, given the geographical and geopolitical compulsions of the situation, how best should India undertake the task? For the present, India’s participation has focused exclusively on economic aid for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the shattered country to the tune of $1.2 billion in specific projects and programmes, which makes it the fifth largest donor in the country. The Indian programme has been a runaway success, very well received by the Afghan people. The flagship of the Indian effort is the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram highway constructed by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), under the vigil of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Afghan security guards, which connects landlocked Afghanistan with the Iranian port of Chahbahar in the Persian Gulf. The road was pushed through in the face of violent attacks by the Taliban acting as surrogates for the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence, because it broke Pakistan’s stranglehold on Afghanistan’s surface access to the world outside, and was obviously detrimental to Pakistan’s strategic interests against India. (Incidentally, one fails to comprehend why the admirable determination and efficiency displayed by Indian agencies against heavy odds in a violent foreign environment cannot be demonstrated at home as well, in expanding and creating critical infrastructure in areas with similar problems within the country, particularly Naxalite and militant-dominated regions?)

Resolution of the Afghan situation also demands the one thing the United States is unable to deliver on a lasting basis — "boots on the ground" for a long-term presence in country, something key to restoration of long-term stability which can be accomplished only by an indigenous Afghan National Army (ANA). This is where India can most effectively assist the Afghan war effort, with large-scale "soldier factories" as in 1962 after the Sino-Indian border war to rapidly expand all branches of the ANA on a crash action basis. Such an effort requires large-scale resources and experience, which the Indian Army is well placed to provide. Afghanistan is indeed a "war of necessity" for India, and building up the ANA is the obvious area on which India should focus in its own long-term interests.

Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury (Retd) is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament