:: Opinion

US aid: A saga of carrots, no sticks

Srinath Raghavan

Oct.16 : The enactment of the Kerry-Lugar Bill marks the onset of an important phase in US-Pakistan relations. The bill provides $1.5 billion annual economic assistance to Pakistan for the next five years. This is in addition to the existing aid packages, including the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) and programmes for the Tribal Areas. The Obama administration has hailed the bill as symbolising America’s long-term commitment to Pakistan. The Pakistan Army and Opposition parties have decried certain provisions of the legislation as undermining Pakistan’s sovereignty.

The rhetoric about the bill from both sides, however, masks its insidious consequences for the region — problems that India (and Afghanistan) will have to anticipate.

The provisions of the bill that have riled the Pakistanis pertain to issues of accountability. The bill requires the administration to certify every year that Pakistan was working to dismantle nuclear proliferation networks; that it had "made progress" on stopping support to terrorist groups operating out of its territory; that the military was not subverting the political process. But the US President can waive this requirement if it was important for American "national security requirements".

Despite the military’s indignation, Islamabad will have to embrace the aid package. Given Pakistan’s dire economic straits, the country’s ruling elite, including the military brass, can scarcely afford to spurn it. Yet the military will also strain every nerve to ensure that notwithstanding the bill’s requirements, it maintains its hold on security policy. The history of US-Pakistan interaction on such matters is a useful guide to the most likely response of the Pakistani military.

The Symington amendment of 1976 prohibited US assistance to any country found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology outside of international safeguards. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter held Pakistan in violation of this amendment owing to its clandestine construction of a uranium enrichment plant. Yet, by 1982, aid began flowing to Islamabad through the use of presidential "waivers" very much like those incorporated in the Kerry-Lugar bill. By this time, of course, the US was seeking Pakistan’s assistance in using the Mujahideen to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.

In 1985, the Pressler amendment was enacted. It proscribed most economic and military assistance unless the President certified annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the provision of aid would significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device. Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush issued this certification despite mounting intelligence on Pakistan’s efforts to possess a nuclear device. Indeed, American "national interest" demanded that evidence of Pakistan’s furtive activities not just be ignored but actively suppressed.

Only in October 1990, after the Soviets had disengaged from Afghanistan, did Washington find Pakistan in violation of the Pressler amendment, triggering the prohibitions. The Brown amendment of 1995 removed most forms of economic aid from the Pressler list; but additional sanctions were imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear test of 1998. All of these were revoked in the wake of 9/11, as Pakistan yet again became important vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the security of its nuclear arsenal a matter of international concern. Since 2001, Pakistan has received $15 billion in American aid — a sum not much less than what is now being promised.

This experience has led the Pakistani military to conclude that so long as it remains important to advancing American interests, the latter would overlook Pakistan’s pursuit of its own strategic goals. The Pressler prohibitions were invoked in 1990 precisely because Pakistan was no longer considered a strategic ally.

The Pakistan military is likely to respond to the latest aid package by continuing to support the Afghan Taliban, so keeping alive the insurgency in Afghanistan and ensuring its own importance to American efforts. At the same time, the military will maintain a low-profile in its support to the anti-India outfits, thereby ensuring that the Obama administration can issue clean chits to Pakistan.

The Americans, for their part, tend to look back on the 1990s as the lost decade. Because of the Pressler prohibitions, contacts with the Pakistani military sharply dwindled. They believe that this period sowed the seeds of mistrust in the Pakistani military mind. The present divide between the two sides — on objectives and strategies — is traced to this evaporation of trust.

The best way to rebuild a strategic relationship, they reckon, is to provide abundant incentives to the Pakistani military to abandon its support for insurgent groups and terrorist outfits. The provision of military aid is the major incentive; also important is the move towards privileging Pakistan’s "strategic interests" in Afghanistan. The latter trend is evident in the recent review by General Stanley McChrystal.

The fatal flaw in this calculus is that American incentives will not be sufficiently attractive to convince the Pakistan Army to abandon the Afghan Taliban and the Kashmir tanzeems, both of which have advanced its regional interests. The more so, since it appears possible to maintain these links while pocketing the aid.

The current US policy towards Pakistan, then, carries the seeds of its own failure. The central problem is the excessive reliance on carrots to modify Pakistan’s behaviour. The Obama administration needs to think seriously about some effective sticks too.

New Delhi might draw some comfort from the language of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. But its potential impact on Pakistan’s strategic orientation will be a matter of concern. In effect, the package sets up incentives for the Pakistan military to stir the pot, albeit not too vigorously. The bill, moreover, does not have any stringent provision to ensure that the "significant majority" of the military aid is, indeed, used for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The only requirement is an assessment by the administration of whether the aid is enabling Islamabad to expand its nuclear arsenal.

This is problematic, especially in the light of recent revelations by retired Pakistani generals that many of the billions of dollars provided under the CSF were used to acquire conventional equipment that could be used against India. New Delhi had conveyed its concerns to Washington, but they have evidently gone unheeded. Clearly we need to do more than merely petitioning the Americans.

n Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi