:: Opinion

Chinese incursions a matter of perception

Srinath Raghavan

Sept.18: India’s disputed boundaries with China are back in the news. Earlier this month, there were reports that a Chinese patrol had intruded into Indian territory in Ladakh, leaving behind tell-tale signs of their presence. More recently, a media report claimed that Chinese troops had fired on Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel in north Sikkim, injuring two soldiers. The Indian government has played down the former and denied the latter.

Public discussions on the matter are far more excited and are unlikely to be assuaged by anodyne official pronouncements. But the ongoing debate is generating more heat than light.

Take the issue of "incursions" by the Chinese. Much of the problem stems from the fact that the two sides have different perceptions of where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) lies. The LAC is supposed to divide the areas that are under Indian and Chinese control since the end of the 1962 war. The line, however, was not mutually agreed upon by the two sides. This is in contrast to similar lines with Pakistan in Kashmir. Both the Ceasefire Line of 1949 and the Line of Control of 1972 were drawn up by formal agreements between the two countries. There was no such agreement on the LAC both because the war ended with a unilateral ceasefire by China and because subsequent efforts by the "Colombo countries" to mediate ended in failure.

In the Ladakh sector, the differences in perception are owing to China’s occupation of additional disputed territory during the war of 1962. The issue of where exactly Chinese forces stood after the war remains contested. The areas where Chinese intrusions occur are claimed by both sides as lying on their side of the LAC.

In the eastern sector — Arunachal Pradesh — the problem is a bit more complicated. The Chinese do not recognise the boundary claimed by India: the McMahon Line. This Line was drawn at the Simla conference of 1914 involving Indian, Chinese and Tibetan representatives. The People’s Republic of China rejected this line as an imperialist creation. Nevertheless, Beijing treats the McMahon Line as the LAC in this sector. The problem is that since 1959, India and China have differed on just where the McMahon Line actually runs. There are "grey areas", which lie north of the McMahon Line as marked in the original maps of 1914, but are actually south of the highest watershed. India’s position — which China does not accept — is that the Line was intended to run along the highest range of mountains dividing Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh, and despite discrepancies the boundary had to be accordingly interpreted.

These grey areas include Namka Chu, Thag La, Sumdurong Chu, Tulung La, Asaphi La, Longju and Chenju. It bears emphasising that there have been no reports of Chinese incursions in other parts of the LAC. We may note parenthetically that there is no LAC or boundary dispute in Sikkim. That boundary was formalised in an Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1890. The residual differences pertain to minor issues such as position of boundary pillars.

In any event, India and China have signed agreements on measures to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LAC. The agreement concluded in 1996 admits that both sides have differing perceptions of the LAC. The Indian Army Chief has stated that "the Chinese have a different perception of the Line of Actual Control as do we. When they come up to their perception, we call it an incursion and likewise they do". To deal with such incursions, the 1996 agreement allows the parties to seek clarifications through diplomatic channels — a mechanism that seems to work well. Besides, there are periodic "flag meetings" between military commanders on both sides to sort out local differences.

The larger question remains: Why have the Chinese increased the frequency of patrolling in these parts?

Paradoxically, China’s recent activism may reflect not the deterioration of relations with India, but the fact that the boundary negotiations have actually made some headway. As the Indian national security adviser observed last year, "Five or six points, the more difficult points are settled… But areas of divergence remain". The most important of these is China’s claim to Tawang; but there is also the issue of the territory acquired by China in the Ladakh sector during the 1962 war.

China’s assertive stance on the ground is evidently intended to buttress its position on the bargaining table. India, too, has rightly made moves to secure its claims by beefing up troops and upgrading logistics along the borders. Until the outlines of the final settlement become clear, there is bound to be some jostling in the contested zones.

The biggest impediments to such a settlement are the domestic politics surrounding the dispute, and the question of Tibet. China’s perceptions and attitude to the boundary dispute with India have always been refracted through the prism of Tibet. Controlling parts of the Ladakh area (including Aksai Chin) was essential to maintaining China’s hold on Tibet. With the recent massive improvement in communications and logistics in Tibet, its importance has diminished. But the growing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang indicates that this area will continue to be of strategic interest to Beijing.

More important, the links between India and Tibet have always been viewed by Beijing with wariness, not to say deep-seated suspicion. The troubles in Tibet have accentuated China’s concerns about what it calls the "Dalai Clique" and its links with India. China’s protests against the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang are directly linked to its territorial claims on the area. Until a settlement is reached, we can expect the Chinese to continue expressing anger and pique on such seemingly trivial issues.

India should find ways of offering more convincing reassurances to China about its attitude to Tibet. This will be essential to removing needless mistrust and to reaching an accord on the boundary. But unless New Delhi informs and shapes domestic opinion, its quest for a settlement is unlikely to succeed.

Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi