:: OP-ED

Rules of engagement

The Age Debate

Induction will raise the conflict tempo

Oct.15 : The government is and must be free to utilise all resources, including defence forces, to suppress anti-national elements. However, the type and quantum of force required must be selected judiciously. At this point in time, it would be imprudent of the Indian Air Force (IAF) to get sucked into anti-Naxal operations.

The first consideration would be to assess the probability of success of air power in this type of situation. Air power is best deployed in the offensive mode, when you can strike the adversary at your time and place of choosing. But then, the targets have to be well-defined and easily discernible from the air. In the case of Naxalites, there are no target systems available — no training camps, no ammunition dumps, concrete structures etc. The targets are mostly humans who concentrate and scoot within the camouflaged jungle areas.

Collateral damage would alienate the ordinary citizen. Examples of Iraq and Afghanistan are before us. This could add to the swelling of Naxal sympathisers, more so among the poorer sections, and rural masses.

Offensive operations would require hard intelligence regularly and accurately. This may not be available to the extent required. Deployment of helicopters in the offensive mode is a possibility. But the inherent risks are large. Helicopters are vulnerable to small arms fire as also short-range shoulder-fired missiles. They also have limitations in terms of range and endurance. Induction of IAF will lead to sophisticated weapons (surface-to-air missiles etc.) being inserted into the area and raising the conflict tempo.

If the gains in the offensive operation role are limited, it is in the support role that air power would make a difference. Some of these are reconnaissance and surveillance, casualty evacuation, ferrying of troops, logistical support etc. Firing for self-protection is necessary and must be cleared by the government before induction.

The genesis of the Naxal movement lies in socio-economic issues. It would, therefore, need a political solution in the ultimate analysis. Use of air power signifies the highest instrument of military engagement. It is escalatory. Will it help in conflict resolution, or delay it? Using excessive force against one’s own people, although misguided, would have its political fallout.

In our country, we have approximately 15 lakh personnel as paramilitary forces. Perhaps the right numbers could be comprehensively trained, motivated and suitably equipped to take on tasks such as anti-Naxal operations. Second, we need to have an organisation on the lines of the Air National Guards. Sufficient helicopters, UAVs, and other such resources could be made available and specifically trained for such special tasks.

Air Marshal P.S. Ahluwalia, former IAF Western command chief

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Air Force can lend focused support

The wording of the motion for debate already conveys a prejudice against the Air Force entering anti-Naxalite operations through the use of the expression "sucked into". It is as if an operation going out of control has already been visualised. Such pessimism is uncalled for.

First, it is the government’s prerogative to use the military in any manner towards a purpose which obviously would be decided after due consideration. There is a difference between military employed against an enemy and that of serving a purpose in support of civilian needs. The Indian mindset often suspects Air Force operations to be escalatory, and worries about high casualty. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Such apprehension stems from ignorance. This negative attitude has already cost the country.

Anti-Naxalite operation is not chasing and getting an enemy, but a focused police operation. It is about providing support measures — rounding up the misguided and the criminals, who are citizens of this country. It could also be an effort to correct those misguided through counter-propaganda and carefully calibrated coercion. It is about paving the way for development of neglected regions and protecting the innocent. It is not a battle to win.

The expectation from the Air Force in this contingency is not "fire power" but to provide support in the areas of logistics, transportation, communication, surveillance and medical support. Apparently, the Maoists are well organised and supported. The Air Force could possibly help in hunting the logistics support trail and help in destroying these. Helicopters equipped with loudspeakers, and transport aircraft, could help propaganda and help distribute pamphlets and leaflets over a wide area. Air Force could provide, where necessary, food and medical relief to affected people and strengthen confidence in the government. It is possible to provide support round the clock and with speed. Helicopters are ideal to move troops and material in a difficult terrain such as jungle. The Air Force has considerable expertise in this field.

Helicopters as well as troops on ground may at times need "protective-fire support" — typically in counter-ambush operations. It is possible to provide accurate fire from on-board helicopters either as a suppressive measure or for attack. Considering risks that this may pose to the innocents in the area, such missions would be carefully planned and executed.

Indian Air Force is a professional air-arm. It is necessary for those at the helm to understand the capabilities, and not hesitate to assess in a timely manner. It is time that we trust our Air Force. Other developed countries would not hesitate to use Air Force assets in a similar contingency. Nor would such a debate be necessary.

Air Chief Marashal

S. Krishnaswamy, former IAF Chief