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General in his labyrinth

Indranil Banerjie

It has been a little more than a year since Pervez Musharraf stepped down from power in Pakistan. Yet he remains a larger-than-life figure in that country. Many revile him while others believe that he did play a role in steering Pakistan out of the economic and political dead end it had got itself into. Pakistan’s mainstream politicians generally despise and fear him. Of late they have been clamouring for his trial under treason charges.

But the general, who recently bought a house in London, remains unfazed. He once claimed that posterity would judge him favourably. Many in Pakistan would beg to differ. In many ways, the general is still on public trial. Villain or saviour: the jury is out on this one. Eventually of course it is the ordinary Pakistani who will judge. But there are many who are already busy evaluating the general’s legacy. One splendid work that stands out is journalist Murtaza Razvi’s somewhat idiosyncratic book on the general’s years in power published by HarperCollins India. Ironical though that the book should be published in India rather than in Pakistan.

Razvi’s purpose appears to be two-fold: one, to chronicle Gen. Musharraf’s 10 years in power and, second, to try and assess his rule. The author’s attempt is to put together a balanced view on the dictator’s days in power. At the outset, the author declares that Musharraf remains somewhat of an enigma. The general’s friends claim that Musharraf tried to pull the country out of "the depths of political, social and cultural obscurantism". They add that he was financially clean and took decisions in the cause of Pakistan. They believe "it was the Americans who finally wanted Musharraf out and got their way. He tried to lift Pakistan out of its quagmire but was failed by the powers that be".

The general’s numerous detractors have a very different view. They hold that "the general was a reckless soldier who undertook the Kargil misadventure, which resulted in a military, political and diplomatic debacle for Pakistan. He was ambitious, and had put a plan in place to mount a coup d’etat against the elected government, and he did". It is also pointed out that Musharraf "would not have resigned on 18 August (2008) had the new coalition government not initiated impeachment proceedings against him, and had it not become patently clear to him that his days in power were numbered".

Razvi takes the reader through a journey back in time beginning with the coup that brought Musharraf to power in October 1999. Most of the book is a concise recount of what happened from then to his ultimate ouster in August 2008. This part would be useful both for readers who have not been following Pakistan as well as for those who have. For the latter, the book would serve as an entertaining recap of events past. For Razvi does not pull his punches and in all provides a rather spirited account of what transpired during the general’s years in power. For example, he narrates how the accountability regime promised by Musharraf "was allowed to die a slow death. Musharraf’s post-2002 election Cabinet included ministers and even chief ministers who were bank defaulters but whose loans were written off, and even pending criminal cases were withdrawn against them in return for their defection from Bhutto’s and Sharif’s parties. Finally, the Bhutto-Zardari and the MQM-specific National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) of 2007 proved the proverbial last nail in the coffin of the so-called National Accountability Bureau and its mandate to arrest the corrupt and recover looted public money from them".

There are few issues regarding Pakistan’s problems that the author shies away from. In one chapter he details the transformation on religious practices and views that have taken place unnoticed in Pakistan in recent years. He argues that Musharraf despite preaching "enlightened moderation" did little to curb the excesses that could be attributed to the rise in religious fundamentalism.

He also discusses the political events in the country’s frontier that led to the current jihadi upsurge and consequent military battles. He writes that Musharraf took action only against the foreign jihadis belonging to the Al Qaida but did nothing against the Taliban. "Musharraf drew little distinction between Taliban of Pakistani and Afghan origins, as both would supposedly serve the Army’s purpose well in an Afghanistan soon to be abandoned by the Americans. The result was that this grossly faulty and self-deluding view allowed pockets of extremism to grow and become virtual states within the state of Pakistan".

Somewhat unusual is the inclusion of several chapters based on interviews at the end of the book. These do not quite fit in with the rest of the book which is a narrative. The interviews, which seek to provide varying assessments of Gen. Musharraf’s tenure, are, however, quite interesting. The most incisive assessment, in my view, is the one provided by strategic affairs writer and analyst, Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, who is quoted as saying that his disastrous eight years of military rule has left her with "cold feet". Razvi asks Dr Saddiqa whether she considers Musharraf to have been truly enlightened and moderate in his thinking. Her reply sort of sums up Musharraf the man: "He drinks, he is fond of women, habits that go back to his early days. He was not conservative like Zia-ul Haq, but for me enlightenment is more in political terms and there he wasn’t".