:: Pran Chopra

US & Pakistan: Talks or double-talk?

Wide Angle / Pran Chopra

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani, must have been a troubled man when he left Islamabad for Washington on July 26 at the invitation of US President George W. Bush. Usually, such visits are described as "goodwill visits" and their purpose is generally stated to be to strengthen mutual relations.

But the circumstances preceding and surrounding this visit were such that all such words would have misrepresented its purpose. This could be one reason why they were held back at first and why they were so lukewarm and qualified when they did come at the end of the visit.

Both parties to that "summit", if it can be called a "summit", have said a few things about what each hoped to get or got out of that meeting. Quite possible that each will say something more about it later. But said already or to be said later, and all of what they might have heard from their home bases, will have to be weighed with care because otherwise the substance of it will be difficult to fathom no matter which side of the table we are looking at.

Both sides had much at stake in the outcome of the "summit". But neither went into the meeting with a lot of hope because each side knew the compulsions and limitations of the other. That is why each side might be tempted to clothe words in ambiguity just as each waited for some glimpse of an outcome of the talks before saying anything about the main issue before them.

This issue had been unveiled on the eve of the visit by such a reputed journal as the International Herald Tribune, the international edition of the New York Times. On July 25, the journal exposed the seamier side of an air operations agreement between the two countries. These operations have been seen in both countries as somewhat questionable.

The Herald Tribune recalled that America has an ongoing multi-million dollar aid programme for Pakistan to fight terrorism on the Afghan border. There is nothing new in that. But the newspaper also added a few curious details.

First, Pakistan would not be given any additional funds for its ongoing programme of fighting the rebels. Only some of the funds already being given to Pakistan, for ground operations, might be transferred to air operations. Second, these transfers depart from the widely held view that in terrain like the Afghan border, ground operations are much more effective against ground-level insurgencies than air attacks can be expected to be.

Third, Pakistan would be happy about this "miscalculation" by America because then Pakistan could use more of its airpower against India. Four, the American Air Force and the Treasury would also be happy - the Air Force because it would get funds it is pressing for, and the Treasury because it would face less strain in its presently strained circumstances if it only means transferring funds from pocket to another.

The Herald added, "Some members of Congress have greeted (the proposed transfers) with dismay and anger and may block the move." The Herald quoted the democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, head of the "approprations sub-committee" of the state department, as saying, "We need to know if this is the best way to help Pakistan combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban." Representative Lowey, who heads a similar House Committee, has asked similar questions.

In addition to all that, President Bush has also raised a different kind of worry for Pakistan. While waiting for Mr Gilani in Washington on July 28, President Bush made it clear that he expected a tougher stand from Pakistan against the Pakistan-based Al Qaeda and Taliban. Pakistan is already facing tough opposition from those (possibly large) sections of the border population that are sympathetic to these Islamic extremists.

But more worrying still for Mr Gilani are some domestic developments in Pakistan which came to the surface while he waited to be accosted by Mr Bush in Washington. The Pakistan government first took the courage to "capture" ISI, as Pakistani newspapers put it , the powerful seat of political and military authority in the country, and then went back on it in the midst of credible press reports that President Musharaf might sack the government.

There is no indication as yet whether Washington had a hand either in the "capture" phase or in its reversal. But an event like this, at a time like this, could not but have figured in Mr Gilani's talks in the US capital. And it must have figured again when ceremonially warm handshakes gave way to a conspicuously unsure "summit" between the two countries. The shadow of that "summit" then travelled all the way from Washington to Colombo, where heads of the Saarc countries met, and thence to Vienna, the seat of a crucial meeting of IAEA about India's hopes of getting a freer hand with nuclear weapons.

But it is what happened in Washington which matters most in this context. Much has been said about the "summit", and about what happened there or did not happen. But what should worry Pakistan more is this passage in another New York Times report which shows that America is no longer handling Pakistan with kid gloves: "A top CIA official travelled secretly to Islamabad" to confront Pakistan's senior officials "with new information about ties between the country's spy services and militants operating in Pakistan's tribal areas" and "they welcomed the decision by the CIA to take a harder line towards the ISI's dealings with militant groups."

Within days of this comment, President Bush, speaking in the course of an unusually firm conversation with the visiting Prime Minister of Pakistan, confirmed to the latter that he shares the suspicion expressed by the "top CIA official".