:: P.C. Alexander

Decision-making time, manner are important

P.C. Alexander

Two recent decisions - one by the Jammu and Kashmir government and the other by the Centre - on certain matters affecting the interests of the entire nation have served to focus attention on the propriety and norms to be observed by democratic administrations, especially by coalition governments, in decision-making. The first is the decision of Jammu and Kashmir government to "divert" about 100 acres of forest land to the Amarnath shrine board and its revocation within a few days because of violent protests against it in the Valley. The second is the decision of the Central government to go ahead with seeking the approval of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency ignoring the vigorous opposition to this move by all the main Opposition parties in Parliament and by the Left parties whose support had kept the UPA government in power during the last four years. I will not go into the merits of these decisions, but will only deal with the timeliness and the manner of taking the decisions.

First, let us take the two decisions of the Jammu and Kashmir government about the diversion of forest land. Several questions arise about the considerations which weighed with the state government in first allotting the land to the shrine board and then making the same land available for use by the pilgrims through the tourism department. First, did the state government consider using the tourism department before deciding to divert the land to the shrine board. If so, why did it rejected this option? Second, had the state government kept the Centre informed of its moves on both these decisions in view of the fact that a decision either way would have a dangerous fallout in a communally sensitive state like Jammu and Kashmir? Third, did the state government obtain the assessment of the intelligence agencies about the likely repercussions of either of the decisions; or was the decision based entirely on the political judgment of the party in power?

If the decisions were taken by the ruling party ignoring the advice of the intelligence agencies and of its main coalition partner the PDP, one should say that it betrayed a strange degree of ineptness in assessing the realities of the political situation in the state. In a matter of about 10 days the government found itself alienated by large sections of people in both the Muslim and Hindu communities. What is worse, these hasty decisions aggravated the divide between Jammu and the Valley. They also gave a platform to the separatist forces in the state to pursue their anti-national agenda. Ultimately, chief minister Ghulam Nabi Azad had to quit office without pressing for a vote in the Legislative Assembly and without any one shedding a tear on his exit. The only debate that will continue now is as to which of the two decisions was more thoughtless. The process of decision making in this case could not have been more disastrous than what it actually was, to say the least.

Now let us turn to the decision of the Central government to approach the IAEA for approval of the Safeguards Agreement relating to the Indo-US nuclear deal.

The question that arises is whether this move for the operationalisation of the deal should have been made now or at a more opportune time later. We should not forget the fact that the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the United States in July, 2005, had not been preceded by any detailed examination of the pros and cons of the proposed deal by experts in India.

Dr Singh's delegation had, in fact, not included a team of nuclear scientists well-versed in this complex subject. Even the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission had to be summoned to Washington to join the delegation after it was presented with the proposal of a nuclear deal.

The normal course in such circumstances would have been for the Prime Minister to express a "broad welcome" to the idea of cooperation on nuclear matters and to inform his counterparts in the US that he would revert with his responses after he had had the opportunity to discuss the various issues with his experts back home.

Instead, the Prime Minister issued a joint statement along with the US President committing India, in no uncertain terms, to be a partner with the US on the lines largely indicated by the US. This led to a fierce controversy in the country on the merits of the proposed deal. The nation found itself sharply divided on the issue of proceeding with the deal in the form in which it was presented by the US government.

While the controversy was raging in the country, the government has been pursuing a "now or never" approach about finalising the deal based on the argument that delay will deny many of its advantages to India. The critics of this approach, on the other hand, question the wisdom of rushing in to finalise the deal with a government in the United States which is to be replaced in just a few months time.

In a situation where the ruling party is confronted with strong opposition from all major non-UPA parties including the Left parties, it would have been prudent on the part of the government to press for more time for evolving a broad support in the country in favour of the deal. There is no question of any damage to national honour or prestige when more time is needed to take on board those who are vigorously opposed to certain provisions in the deal. At any rate avoiding a sharp division within the nation on an important policy issue like the Indo-US nuclear deal is vital for the success of the deal itself. If some more time and efforts were necessary for this, it was worth insisting on them.

Mere conviction on the part of the party leading a coalition government (comprising 23 parties and still depending on the support from outside) that the deal is the best that India can get is not enough.

The UPA government may come out successful if a vote of confidence is pressed in Parliament because of the "100 per cent support" promised by the Samajwadi Party. But a wafer thin majority secured by adding the votes of a large number of small parties (with two or three votes each) in Parliament cannot be a substitute for a national consensus. Some of these small parties may be supporting the UPA government for reasons totally unrelated to the merits of the nuclear deal.

A genuine national backing is as important for the successful implementation of the deal as its own merits. That is why the manner of decision-making has become crucial in the finalisation of the deal.

Dr P.C. Alexander was the Governor of Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu