:: Nihal Singh

Checkmate, Russia

S. Nihal Singh

Augest.14 : As Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia last week observed the first anniversary of the Georgian-Russian little war a year ago in contrasting ways, the bitter exchanges between Moscow and Tbilisi make one point crystal clear. Georgia, together with Ukraine, is the new faultline in Russia’s relations with the West, in particular the United States. If Berlin was the trip wire in the days of the Cold War, these countries serve the same purpose today.

Not long ago, Georgia’s "rose revolution" in 2003, followed by Ukraine’s "orange revolution" a year later and Kyrgyzstan’s "tulip revolution" in 2005, were heady days for Western strategists hoping to bring these former Soviet states into their fold. The Ukrainian and Georgian governments’ ambition to belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato). Nato was vociferously supported by Washington over the protests of Moscow.

South Ossetia and the Black Sea region of Abkhazia had broken away from Georgia, which gained independence with the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 90s. But the telegenic and impetuous President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, bit off more than he could chew by getting his forces to attack South Ossetia’s capital on August 7 last year provoking a devastating Russian response. It was, in fact, to promote his macho image that he thought he could reintegrate the region.

The war lasted five days killing more than 500 people and displacing many. Indeed, Mr Saakashvili’s gamble misfired badly because he had misread the signs of the times and Washington’s freedom of action. For one thing, he had forgotten that the United States had encouraged the breakaway Yugoslav province of Kosovo to declare independence, ignoring dire warnings from Moscow that changing European borders by force — flouting the new holy grail of the post-war world — was playing with fire.

Russia, somewhat unwisely, sought to drive the point home by recognising the two breakaway regions of Georgia and South Ossetia as independent states, recognised thus far only by Moscow and Nicaragua. The measure was as much to tell the West that two could play the game of changing borders as to claim Russia’s "privileged interest" in its "near abroad", the former Soviet space. US vice-president Joe Biden gave his riposte during his visit to Tbilisi, "We don’t recognise, and I want to reiterate this, any sphere of influence".

Ukraine and Georgia have become the touchstone of Russia’s relations with the West because Moscow has drawn a red line as far as their entry into Nato is concerned, despite seeing Washington demolish previous red lines by taking in the Baltic states and Poland. After the debacle of the break-up of the Soviet Union, eight years of Vladimir Putin presidency and high energy prices have made Russia more confident and capable of fighting for its interests. The European heavyweights are more conscious of the stakes involved than Washington and successfully stalled the two countries’ Nato membership.

The American misfortune is that both Ukraine and Georgia are involved in internal power struggles, are divided over their future and are no paragons of democracy. Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko is involved in a bitter battle for power with his Prime Minister, the attractive Yulia Tymoshenko with her trademark peasant braid, while the nation is almost equally divided between a Russian-inclined East and a pro-US West.

It is a marvel that Mr Saakashvili remains Georgia’s President. Thousands of demonstrators had taken to the streets to seek his resignation last April. Despite American fondness for him, it is no secret that he has diligently set about closing opposition newspapers and television channels and wishes to rule his country as a little dictator.

The truth is that the colour of the so-called colour revolutions has faded and beyond the slogans of democracy and wishing to "belong to Europe", a code for joining the European Union and Nato, the two countries are undergoing painful transitions. These are defined more by personal struggles of power and the desire to receive massive Western assistance than issues of ideology. Georgia was pledged $4.5 billion after the nasty little war, of which it has received only a third.

In "resetting" relations with Russia through his own visit, US President Barack Obama was careful to send his vice-president to Ukraine and Georgia to make the point that he had not forgotten them. While Mr Biden gave his country’s support to the two countries’ aspirations leavened with mild lectures, he was careful not to suggest a time frame for their membership of Nato. Washington recognises that the Continental heavyweights remain opposed to provoking Russia by embracing Ukraine and Georgia as Nato members soon.

The problem for the West is somewhat complicated by the fact that oil and gas routes dear to the West run through Georgia and skirt South Ossetia. Energy supplies and how to reduce European dependence on Russia lie at the heart of the new political chess game being played by all sides on the European continent and Central Asia. Turkey, seen by Washington as the saviour in this battle as the hub for Central Asian gas avoiding Russian territory, has just played host to Russian Prime Minister Putin to agree to a Russian-sponsored oil and gas route.

The danger, of course, is that Ukraine and Georgia will end up being pawns in a larger game being played by Russia and the West. In any event, their internal problems give them reduced leverage in seeking gains for their countries. The division between East and West Ukraine is so sharp that, unless handled wisely, it could lead to a break-up. And if Mr Saakashvili chooses to promote his authoritarian tendencies further, he would merely embarrass his American backers although Washington is often flexible in defining democracy.

While Ukraine must await the next presidential election, Georgia faces the reality of losing the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, perhaps for good. It is advantage Russia in the sense that it has acquired the valuable Abkhazian Black Sea coast for stationing its strategic forces on friendly soil. The United States has been training and arming Georgian forces but must calibrate its next moves with an eye on their impact on its relations with Russia.