:: Nihal Singh

A US move that is all about Russia

S. Nihal Singh

Sept.24 : President Barack Obama has reset one button in relations with Russia by scrapping his predecessor's fancy plan to install radars and missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic in favour of a water-borne project nearer the supposed target, Iran. Although there are many more buttons to reset, this removes a major irritant in relations with Moscow, which understandably interpreted the original move as a further attempt to restrict and contain it.

Whatever President George W. Bush's justification, everyone knew that the former European satellites of the Soviet Union welcomed the move because it would mean the stationing of American troops on their soil to act as a further defence against a future assertive Russia. It was, however, unpopular among the masses that feared the project would provoke Russia. The gloom in official circles in Poland and Czech Republic is vociferously supported by US Republicans who fear that it is sending wrong signals to Eastern Europe.

In fact, the new plan for an anti-Iranian security structure in the seas will provide a protective umbrella to Israel and the Arabian Gulf hinted at by US secretary of state Hillary Clinton in the past. The official US explanation is that the change of Iranian emphasis from long-range to short- and medium-range missiles makes a sea-based plan better and smarter. According to Ms Clinton, "this decision is not about Russia".

Official American stances aside, Russia has welcomed the scrapping of the Bush plan, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin even calling it a "brave decision". And US defence secretary Robert Gates has made another gesture in declaring, "For more than two years I have encouraged the Russians that we are partners in this missile defence. The Russians have a radar in southern Russia, the Armavir radar, that actually could fill a gap in coverage, and we would welcome the Russians networking with us in this. We think we can make that happen".

The Obama administration's hope is that Russia will make a gesture in response, apart from taking back its threat to install missiles in Kalinigrad on the European Union's head. Since Iran and its nuclear programme is so much in American - and Israeli - cross-hair, Washington is praying that Moscow will be more amenable to tightening sanctions on Iran, should the planned meeting early next month fail to yield results. Mr Putin, on his part, has indicated that he is expecting further friendly moves from Washington, for instance in removing roadblocks to its membership of the World Trade Organisation.

Nato's new secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen has added his own voice to the Obama administration's initiative by calling for cooperation with Russia, including possible cooperation between anti-missile systems. He has even suggested that he is willing to listen to President Dmitry Medvedev's proposal for building new security architecture.

Is a new spring then dawning on the often frosty and ill-tempered relations between the United States and Russia? The significance of the Obama administration's move is that it has delivered on removing at least one major hurdle troubling the relationship. And implicit in Mr Rasmussen's approach is the understanding that the question of taking Georgia and Ukraine into Nato over Moscow's vociferous objections has been put on the back burner. In any event, Ukraine is deeply divided and Georgia's two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have declared themselves independent and won Russian recognition.

However, there is nothing to suggest that Washington has given up on its goal of maintaining its pre-eminence in the world into the distant future. What has changed is the emphasis from the Bush administration's form of unilateralism buttressed by armed strength to emphasising the merits of diplomacy and multilateralism without foregoing the military option. Washington's post-Cold War goal of containing and restricting Russia has not changed.

The United States still believes that the Euro-Atlantic compact embodied in Nato is valid as is its attempt to secure the loyalties of countries in Russia's "near abroad". It is willing to bide its times before bringing Georgia and Ukraine firmly into its orbit but will not agree to Moscow pursuing a policy of "privileged interests" in the region. Similarly, despite Mr Rasmussen's charm offensive, Nato will remain an organisation inimical to Russian interests because it cannot realistically include the Russian Federation in its ranks.

What the Obama administration's new plan has done, even if it is only a by-product of changed strategy, is that it has improved the atmosphere between Washington and Moscow to look at their broader common interests. A new treaty to replace the Start agreement should now be easier to complete by the end of the year. Russia has already allowed Nato weapons and troops transit its air space on their way to Afghanistan and there are points of convergence over non-proliferation goals.

It is not clear how far Russia will go in pursuing a harsh policy towards Iran because, apart from Moscow's legitimate interests in Iran, it has doubts over the efficacy and wisdom of imposing further sanctions on Tehran. President Obama's decision to engage with Iran is wise, despite the turmoil following the presidential election there, but the sub-text of his initiative is that Tehran should suffer more severe sanctions if it does not satisfy Western demands, which seem to be veering round to allowing Iran to undertaking the full nuclear cycle under strict international supervision.

The new spirit of cooperation must nevertheless be welcomed for opening the way to a more cooperative world. In any event, it reduces Washington's strains with the Continental heavyweights over Europe's relations with Russia. The original decision of retaining Nato in the post-Cold War world was flawed and expanding its brief to intervene in out-of-area conflicts, as in Afghanistan, seemed to presage an inclination in Washington to employ it as a subsidiary military arm of American foreign policy. Over the decades, Washington has assiduously opposed moves to give the UN Secretary-General the wherewithal to intervene quickly in world crises even with UN Security Council sanction.