:: Inder Malhotra

ISI muscle central to Pakistan power play

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NEVER BEFORE — except, of course, in 1971 when it lost its more populous eastern half – has Pakistan been in so tight a corner as now. Suddenly, it is facing unprecedented and mounting American pressure to end what the Americans are publicly denouncing as the Pakistani spy agency ISI’s blatant links with Taliban militants enjoying sanctuary and support in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The US has squarely blamed the ISI for involvement in the July 7 suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s visit to Washington has done nothing to dent American concerns or to meet even partially American demands.

It was while Mr Gilani was on his way to Washington that, obviously in anticipation of the US demand for "reining in" the ISI, the Pakistan government issued a late-night notification placing the all-powerful spy outfit under the "administrative, financial and operational control" of the interior ministry. Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistan People’s Party leader, who really runs the civilian government, crowed that this had been done to save the Army and the ISI from "unfair foreign criticism". Within 12 hours, however, the government had to beat a hasty retreat and cancel the order, pretending that the notification had been "misinterpreted". What had actually happened was that "Rawalpindi", where the Army GHQ is located, and the "presidency", a euphemism for General (retired) Pervez Musharaf, had "intervened".

With conspicuous unanimity the Pakistani media has poured scorn over this "pathetic turn-about" and underscored what the reality of power configuration in Pakistan is. One newspaper went to the extent of saying that next time the ISI would be transferred to the "Department of Haj". But none of this deterred Mr Gilani from boasting in the US capital that both, the Army Chief and the ISI, were "under the Prime Minister".

From Washington, the Pakistani Prime Minister headed for Colombo for the 15th Saarc Summit. There he was at the receiving end of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s forthright complaint about ISI’s role in the dastardly attack on the Indian embassy in the Afghan capital and in several places within India. (Later, the Afghan President, Mr Hamid Karzai, was even more blunt in his conversation with the Pakistani Prime Minister.) Mr Gilani’s initial response to Dr Singh, that he would hold an "independent inquiry" and get to the "root of the matter", seemed reasonable enough. But before the Summit dispersed, he summarily rejected all charges of ISI complicity in terrorist attacks on Afghanistan or India. Other Pakistani sources described Indian and Afghan charges as "total rubbish."

This brings us face to face with the fundamental reality in Pakistan. Since at least 1958, that country has been ruled by a permanent establishment dominated overwhelmingly by the Army. When the man in control of the gun hasn’t sat on the throne himself, he has stood behind the throne, temporarily occupied by whosoever. There were great expectations that the February 2008 general election would put an end to this. Sadly, all high hopes have been dashed to the ground. The PPP-led government has turned out to be both, ineffectual and fragile. Its durability is in serious doubt because the differences between Mr Zardari and his Party and the coalition partner, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) are acute. In addition, President Musharraf, though unwanted by the people, clings to the office of the President.

Even if Mr Nawaz Sharif and Mr Zardari manage to arrive at a modus vivendi of sorts, it cannot overcome the enormity of their differences. Mr Sharif wants immediate reinstatement of all judges sacked by President Musharraf, including that of the Chief Justice whose dismissal had shaken his hold on the country. This does not suit Mr Zardari and many of his cohorts. They fear that the restored CJ would invalidate the ordinance under which charges against them were withdrawn by President Musharraf whose immediate ouster is also high on Mr Sharif’s agenda. Mr Zardari is no hurry to drive away the former dictator. This is because of wheels within wheels, to understand which it is necessary to return briefly to the aborted move to hand over the ISI to the interior ministry. Mr Rehman Malik, who controls this ministry, is not an elected minister but an appointed "advisor". He was at one time director of the Federal Investigation Bureau. During Benazir Bhutto’s days as Prime Minister he became chief of her security and her confidant. When she went in self-exile so did he. No wonder Mr Zardari trusts him more than anyone else.

Add to this another calculation of Mr Zardari’s. He knows that partnership with Mr Sharif would end sooner or later. He also fears that the PPP might split at some stage. What does he do then? His only option is to join hands with the dispossessed former supporters of President Musharraf who call themselves Pakistan Muslim League (Q). So President Musharraf could have some utility still.

In this complex and far from comforting context, Khaled Ahmed, one of the highly respected Pakistani analysts, has candidly summed up the overall Pakistani situation, especially in relation to the outside world. According to him, Pakistan is being buffeted by three "clashing yet converging" strands of thought: First, the realisation that there is some substance in the outside world’s complaint that Pakistan has become the epicenter of jihadi terrorism and "ground zero" for getting even with Osama bin Ladin. Secondly, the strong current of opinion within the civil society that the very definition of terrorism is wrong — that the US is the enemy of Islam and thus of Pakistan. The third school of thought, says Ahmed, is "India-driven" and "backed by the Pakistan Army". According to it, India is the "only existential threat to Pakistan", that India is collaborating with the other major adversary, Mr Karzai’s Afghanistan, with the US backing both. This understandably strengthens the second doctrine that Pakistan needs to fight India, strongest power in the region, as well as the United States, the greatest global power.

Policymakers in this country need to ponder this scenario. Especially at a time when Pakistan’s Army and the ISI have casually started violating the ceasefire that had lasted four-and-a-half years and resumed patronage of the merchants of terror in this country, thus disrupting the peace process.