:: Inder Malhotra

Reforms in IFS are most welcome

Inder Malhotra

AT long last, after a great deal of cogitation and debate, and with the approval of the Union Cabinet, a five-year plan for comprehensive reform, reorganisation and revamping of the Indian Foreign Service is ready for implementation. The core of the project is to double, over the five-year period, the IFS’ existing strength of 620. Of the extra hands, as they are recruited and trained, many more would be posted to the ministry of external affairs in New Delhi than would be sent to embassies in need of strengthening or new missions that might have to be opened.

In an age of grinding economic crisis and financial crunch, the proposed expansion of the Foreign Service may appear extravagant, especially because since the Fifth Pay Commission, a decade ago. the government has been committed to downsizing the bureaucracy and to avoid creation of new posts. But the need for a big increase in the strength of the diplomatic service is genuine and should be obvious. For a country of India’s size that also is major actor on the international stage — India is always included in the six powers that prop up the present world order, such as it is — a larger Foreign Service is surely necessary. (The other five are the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and Japan.)

Yet, India’s Foreign Service is among the smallest. That of Brazil is four times its size and China’s is seven times larger. The ration of officers posted at the headquarters to those deployed in diplomatic missions abroad is abysmally inadequate.

For instance, one territorial division, headed by a joint secretary, looks after as many as 23 countries. In a "better off" division one joint secretary, assisted by one director, two deputy secretaries and three under-secretaries, deals with three countries of such crucial importance as Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

In any rational arrangement, there should be a joint secretary in charge of each of these three countries, with someone above them, an additional or special secretary, supervising the region. The plight of the eastern division — in charge of China, Japan and the two Koreas — is not much different. Of the rest, the less said the better.

Of course, a mere quantitative expansion would be of no avail, if there is no corresponding increase in the quality of work. All the recruits to the service, like those to other all-India services, come through the competitive examination and are selected by the Union Public Services Commission. Moreover, everyone selected by the UPSC has a right to choose the service he or she wishes to join. Time was when those on top of the list used to opt for the IFS. But that has become a thing of the past. The powers of the IAS and the possibilities offered by the Indian Revenue Service have been more attractive.

Incidentally, the present pattern of recruitment is causing a problem in the South Block. Quite a few recruits who opt for the Foreign Service each year know very little English because they appear in the UPSC examination in Hindi and other Indian languages and are from schools and colleges where the medium of instruction is their mother tongue. Even at present the MEA has been sending such probationers to the Foreign Service Institute for special training in English. But this arrangement would need to be both enlarged and upgraded as the intake of officers increases.

A more important decision included in the five-year plan relates to training in foreign languages. Up to now this country, like others, was using in the realm of diplomacy the languages that are adopted by the United Nations. Because of the great and growing importance of the neighbouring countries, Pushtu, Darri, Tibetan and Myanmarese (Burmese) are being added. An essential feature of the plan to make the IFS more effective is that for the first 12 years of his or her service an officer would be posted only to those countries where the language of their choice is spoken. This reform is vital, and one can only hope that it would indeed be adhered to.

In the past, four officers specialising on China and fluent in Mandarin were posted, one after the other, as ambassador to Algiers. In several other cases, after the very first appointment in their careers, officers were never sent to areas of their specialisation.

The doubling of the IFS’ strength also has a flip side from the point of view of those joining it. Competition for promotions, especially for rising to the top jobs, would be much harder. The number of foreign countries is unlikely to increase, except marginally. To be an ambassador would, therefore, be doubly difficult. Also there would be only one foreign secretary though the number of secretaries might increase. The authors of the reform plan have also decided that no one who hasn’t had three postings in the country or countries that comprise the area of his or her specialisation can become joint secretary, and without having served as a joint secretary at the headquarters no one would be appointed ambassador. More imaginatively, at every stage of promotion, there would be a test as well as a refresher course.

Nothing, however, can be perfect. There are some shortcomings also in the Foreign Office’s reform plan. The most distressing of these is the refusal to resurrect the MEA’s Historical Division. The abrupt and inexplicable abolition of this useful institution many years ago was a disaster. Failure to being it back to life is catastrophic. Apparently, decision-makers feel that the functions of the Historical division can be outsourced, in bits and pieces, to think tanks and the groves of academe.

Ironically, at the time of its abolition some of the Historical Division’s functions were transferred to the Policy Planning Division (PPD) that, unfortunately, has been a pointless fifth wheel of the coach. The plan’s authors have regretfully concluded that nothing can make the PPD effective. Why have it in that case?