The much-awaited “peace jirga” in Afghanistan came to an end last Friday, after three days of intense discussions. Convened by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the jirga comprised nearly 1,600 delegates from all parts of the country. The very composition of the jirga highlighted both the lines of animosity segmenting the Afghan political system and the measure of the challenge facing the Afghan President. Mr Karzai managed to bring to the tent some veteran warhorses of the jihad against the Soviets: Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, Burhanuddin Rabbani. None of them enjoy a strong political following, but all are eager to emerge as grey eminences. The last, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was even appointed chairman of the jirga, much to the consternation of old foes.
Interestingly, Mr Rabbani had backed Abdullah Abdullah — the principal Opposition candidate — during last year’s presidential elections. Mr Abdullah, however, pointedly refused to participate in the jirga. General Rashid Dostum, an erstwhile ally of Mr Karzai and a powerful regional leader, declined to attend as well. Indeed, the major political groupings from north and central Afghanistan were lukewarm in their support for the jirga — an indication of the differing priorities attached to the peace process by the leaders of the relatively stable parts of the country. And, of course, the principal insurgent groups — the Taliban, the Haqqanis, and the Hezb-i-Islami — ostentatiously stayed away and sought to disrupt the gathering.
The jirga was an attempt by Mr Karzai to secure wide support for his efforts to deal with the insurgent groups. In particular, he sought endorsement for his plans for reintegration of, and reconciliation with, sections of the insurgency. The delegates were tasked with looking into three related issues: whether negotiations with the Taliban were desirable; if so, the framework and structures for the process; and measures to strengthen national unity. The jirga devolved into 28 committees which discussed these questions and came up with recommendations.
On the whole, the jirga accorded its approval for Mr Karzai’s efforts to negotiate with the insurgents. However, some of the specific recommendations indicated the broad contours within which any such effort would have to be undertaken. First, insurgents seeking reintegration would have to sever ties with “foreign terrorist groups”. Second, the progress made with respect to “democracy and women’s rights should not be sacrificed”. Third, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation troops must continue to support Afghanistan, but should also be mindful of civilians in conducting their operations. Taken together, these three criteria would seem to rule out any serious negotiations with the Taliban leadership. For each of these requirements, especially the last, is entirely unacceptable to the Taliban leadership.
Mr Karzai should be pleased with this outcome. Contrary to widespread speculation, he does not harbour hopes of reconciling with the top leadership of the Taliban. In fact, the option that he appears to favour is to arrange political asylum for these leaders in another country. The thrust of his plans is on reintegration of lower-level fighters and possibly some local commanders. Here, too, the jirga signalled a go-ahead.
The Peace and Reintegration Programme drawn up by the government envisages a three-tiered approach. At the top would be a national-level “Peace and Reconciliation High Council” which would preside over a “Joint Secretariat” tasked with formulating and coordinating policy. Work at the provincial-level will be coordinated by “Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration Committees”. The actual reaching out to insurgent fighters will occur further down the chain — at the district level by “Peace and Reintegration Committees”. The challenge is to work this ramified system.
Past experience in Afghanistan suggests that reintegration is unlikely to be easy. Various programmes undertaken from 2003 onwards have had patchy success. The reasons for their failure are a matter of active debate, not least because of its implications for the current efforts. In essence, the divide turns on the question of what makes these low-level insurgents fight. The proponents of reconciliation insist that nearly 70 per cent of the fighters have taken up arms for financial reasons. The Taliban and other groups are able to offer much better pay-packets than other alternatives, including government jobs. They also argue that the failure of the previous efforts was mainly because those programmes were not adequately funded. Sceptics, however, argue that the insurgents are ideologically-driven and that the local commanders exercise a considerable hold on the foot soldiers. Hence, the failure of past attempts at reintegration. A variant of this is the claim that the insurgents are deeply opposed to the corruption and rapacity of the Afghan government. It is difficult to adjudicate between these competing claims; for all of them are based on sketchy and even biased data. For instance, the last argument is being trotted out by groups who have long denounced the Afghan government as irredeemably venal.
In any event, the Afghan government doesn’t have the luxury of indulging in such debates. The Taliban are proving a tough nut to crack. Even in places such as Marja, where the coalition forces have gone on the offensive, the insurgents are trickling back in. The Afghan security forces remain in an embryonic stage, plagued by an absence of adequate trainers. Indeed, a recent Pentagon report identified this as among “the most significant challenges” facing the counter-insurgency efforts. In such a situation, Mr Karzai will want to try and wean away at least some of the fighters. The outcome might well depend on one factor that is currently being overlooked: the efficacy of the US troops’ surge in the coming months. If the beefed-up coalition forces are able to achieve a degree of domination over the Taliban, then the lower-level fighters may be inclined to consider the government’s reintegration offers. The experience of the 2001 campaign also suggests that green berets and green backs work best when in concert. The recent mending of ties between Washington and Kabul was long overdue. But whether or not there is enough mutual confidence to achieve the requisite degree of strategic coordination remains to be seen.

n Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi