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  A tough balancing act

A tough balancing act

| NILANJAN MUKHOPADHYAY
Published : Sep 23, 2016, 1:06 am IST
Updated : Sep 23, 2016, 1:06 am IST

The Narendra Modi government’s response to the brutal Uri terror attack, in the short term as well as in the long term, will play a decisive role in shaping the Prime Minister’s legacy on a mass of ta

The Narendra Modi government’s response to the brutal Uri terror attack, in the short term as well as in the long term, will play a decisive role in shaping the Prime Minister’s legacy on a mass of tangled issues whose tackling will continue to cast its shadows on his government. As part of his tactic to emerge as serious contender for power, Mr Modi started sharing views on national and international issues despite at least three others holding competing positions — party president and leaders of the party in the two Houses.

Mr Modi’s intervention on issues outside his remit as chief minister was with the aim of being seen as the primary carrier of the alternate viewpoint. In the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks, Mr Modi had to be advised by then Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh to delay his visit. When he eventually toured the city, he used media interactions to criticise Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and demanded a meeting of all state chief ministers and asked sarcastically kya kiya before replying — kuch nahi kiya. This was the first indication that Mr Modi was projecting himself as not just a majoritarian leader but also a menacing neo-nationalistic leader.

Between 2008 and 2014, Mr Modi referred to 26/11 in his campaign time and again. He expressed disapproval of the non-military initiatives of the UPA government to isolate and weaken Pakistan. Mr Modi found fault with the exchange of lists of wanted terrorists, referring to communication with Islamabad as “love letters” and demanded that replies to Pakistan should be in the language it understood. “Aatankwad ko panpaane waalon ko, usi bhaasha mein samjhaana padega”.

Mr Modi constructed his image of a no-nonsense nationalist and claimed diplomatic manoeuvres to check Islamabad’s design were useless. Sample this: “Pakistan comes and hammers us and we send out minister to America. He laments ‘Obama, Obama’. Why go to America, go to Pakistan.” By the time Mr Modi was swept to power, his admirers were certain that at the slightest provocation, Mr Modi would press a few nondescript buttons and efface Pakistan. India finally had a leader who could talk tough. For generations that grew with the dream of Akhand Bharat, Mr Modi’s statements were an indication that what was left unfinished in 1971 would be accomplished under his leadership. But even before he assumed charge, Mr Modi demonstrated that his campaign mantra was being toned down and his pragmatic side was revealed when he invited Saarc leaders to his inaugural.

Because of the manner in which Indo-Pak ties are intertwined with the Kashmir imbroglio, the handling of the two issues has cast a shadow on the other. Cancellation of foreign secretary-level talks in 2014 provided indication that Mr Modi was not keen on dialogue with separatists. The BJP’s Mission 44+ in J&K demonstrated audacious political ambition of the party. But subsequent government formation with Mufti Mohammad Sayeed did not please BJP cadre. Likewise, in its handling of the dialogue, or the lack of it, with Pakistan, Mr Modi displayed vacillation alternating between a hard stance and a reconciliatory approach.

After the meeting with Nawaz Sharif in Ufa, Russia, and before the Pathankot attack, Mr Modi did not live up to the image of an aggressive leader. If his Lahore visit and response to Pathankot attack angered his flock, they were placated by his mentioning the B-word in his I-Day speech. In the alternating actions of the Mr Modi, his supporters are awaiting for what they would be conclude as a macho response. Publicly, the official Bhakt brigade has not yet expressed dismay at the absence of immediate military intervention but large sections, not politically indoctrinated, are growing restive and want direct military action. The challenge that Mr Modi faces on his response is similar to his troubles stemming from over-hyping promises.

Managing conflict with Pakistan has never been easy and has been acutely faced by each of Mr Modi’s predecessors. Islamabad’s role in promoting proxy war against India took a different turn after the two South Asian adversaries acquired nuclear teeth in their armoury. While a rogue state could count on India’s restraint and trigger the Kargil conflict, India has no such assessment to bank on. Moreover, globally India’s image has been greatly enhanced as a responsible power and much is at stake to ensure that this reputation is not shattered. Prior to 9/11 there were few takers internationally, on Indian claim of being victim of cross-border terrorism. Indian support for the US-led war on terror and its calibrated response post-December 13 terror attack on the Indian Parliament — it remains the grisliest terror attack on India — earned goodwill even though Western nations withdrew their diplomats from the “most dangerous place on earth”.

The Indo-US relationship was revived during President Bill Clinton’s visit in March 2000. The Vajpayee government and the UPA built on this foundation and this investment benefited India as the US somewhat turned the screws on Pakistan. Under Mr Modi, there were apprehensions if Indo-US ties would remain at par or begin a downhill slide again. But as events have demonstrated, the relationship between the two nations is now at an all-time high. For this association to remain firm, Mr Modi cannot be belligerent while responding to Uri or act unilaterally. Instead he has to draw support from diplomatic allies. To secure this Mr Modi even took the questionable decision of inviting a Pakistani probe team to gather information after the Pathankot attack.

Any action that is not overtly militarist in nature does not display immediate “result”. Consequently, Mr Modi will become open to accusations that he levelled against Dr Singh. After all, no meeting of chief ministers was called in the aftermath of the January attack and likelihood of one now appears remote because it will serve little purpose. Much has to be done besides using the “phone a friend” option. This includes initiating long-term measures to beef up security of high-risk installations. Mr Modi will undoubtedly struggle to retain support of those who expected quick response and fight to finish. He will also have to find ways to fend accusations of the Opposition: Kya kiya Kuch nahi kiya.

The writer is the author of Narendra Modi: The Man, the Times and Sikhs: The Untold Agony of 1984