Salman bridge & ‘Islamic Nato’

Over the last year, Saudi Arabia has been experiencing a series of crises that have strained its economy, jeopardised its security and threatened its leadership of the Arab and Islamic world. The kingdom has recently responded to these challenges with a series of deft moves that could redefine the regional strategic architecture.

Sensing the rising tide of Iranian influence across West Asia after the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, since 2011, gave up its traditional accommodative posture in regional affairs and decided to challenge Iran in its traditional bastions. In Syria, it backed the Islamist militia to secure regime change, while in Yemen it directly involved itself in military action against the Iran-backed Houthi militia.

However, with the conflicts grinding to a stalemate on both battlefronts, Saudi Arabia has not shied away from peace processes. In Syria, it has been supportive of the US-Russian initiative that has achieved a “cessation of hostilities” and pulled the contending parties to the Geneva-III conference, and in Yemen the Saudis have created a divide between the Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh by entering into secret negotiations with the former.

Amidst these challenges, the Saudis are most disturbed by the US’ interaction with Iran and its accommodation of Iran on the nuclear question. In response to what it sees as the US’ “abandonment of the Arab world”, the kingdom has shaped the “Salman doctrine”, named after Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz, whereby, in the candid words of Saudi commentator Nawaf Obaid, it will not allow Iran “to give its minority Shia sect the upper hand in worldwide Islam (which would) disrupt 1,400 years of majority Sunni domination”.

Accordingly, in order to obtain a new balance of power in West Asia, Saudi Arabia is seeking to put together an “Islamic Nato”. This has emerged from the month-long “Thunder of the North” military exercises conducted in February 2016, which brought together about 150,000 troops from 21 largely Muslim countries in a new “Islamic military coalition”. This force is to be directed at “terrorist” groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al Qaeda and Shia militia, which are sponsored by Iran and which Saudi Arabia sees as backing Bashar al-Assad and promoting Iranian interests in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.

Details relating to this force remain unclear, with suggestions that the coalition might just be a “coordinator” rather than a well-defined joint force.

There is no such ambiguity in the ties that the kingdom is shaping with its traditional partner, Egypt. Overcoming differences with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on both Syria and Yemen (where al-Sisi has opposed regime change and military intervention, respectively), King Salman, in a landmark visit in early April, secured a strategic partnership on the basis of the return of two islands in the Red Sea to the kingdom, the agreement to set up a bridge from the Saudi border to the Sinai, thus linking Asia with Africa, and a significant increase of Saudi investment in the ailing Egyptian economy.

The two islands, Tiran and Sanafir, are located at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba; they thus have considerable geo-strategic value since both Israeli and Jordanian shipping, from Eilat and Aqaba respectively, crosses these islands before entering the Red Sea. Reports from Israel indicate that discussions on the islands’ handover had been going on for several months and that Israel was kept in the picture.

The Saudi-Egypt bridge, to be named King Salman Bridge, is expected to have great significance: Besides binding the countries in a solid strategic embrace, it will boost both commerce and tourism. It could also open up the backward and neglected Sinai through a network of roads and tourism development projects.

In the economic arena, the agreements signed during the king’s visit have a total value of about $25 billion, and include Saudi investment for the development of an industrial zone at the Suez Canal and the setting up of a joint investment fund valued at $16 billion.

These dramatic initiatives have their fair share of sceptics and detractors. The “Islamic Nato” has generated doubt about the efficacy of a “coalition” hastily put together as a show of force against Iran; few countries share the kingdom’s uncompromising sectarian agenda. Nor do many see it as an effective force against Al Qaeda and the ISIS, since any credible action would require fighting on the ground, which would need the active involvement of Iran, Iraq and the Assad regime.

In Egypt, there has been widespread opposition to the handover of the two islands, which are generally seen as integral parts of the Egyptian homeland, which al-Sisi does not have the mandate to barter away. But, al-Sisi’s urgent need for Saudi largesse could encourage him to uphold his agreement with Riyadh.

The one capital where the initiatives discussed above have received fulsome welcome is Tel Aviv: Israelis are delighted with the “Sunni” military coalition against Iran and Hezbollah. They have been happy to back the handover of the two islands to Saudi Arabia, seeing this as strengthening their ties with the “moderate” Arabs represented by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They believe that their support, with that of Saudi Arabia, will keep al-Sisi in power and the Muslim Brotherhood at bay, with al-Sisi obliging them by placing curbs on the Hamas in Gaza.

Finally, as Israeli writer Ben Caspit has noted, once the principle of “territorial transfer” has been conceded by the Arab majors in the region, the day is not far away when Israel and the regional powers could together find territorial spaces for the Palestinians in Egypt and Jordan, allowing Israel to retain most of the West Bank.

The Saudi-Egypt-Israel axis, already active in the shadows for some time, could define the future strategic shape of West Asia, end all hope of realising Palestinian aspirations and doom the region to ever-lasting conflict. The writer is a former diplomat