Modi’s diplomatic flip-flops

The foreign policy of any nation is both continuity and innovation within established boundaries of national political consensus. Politicians during electioneering often make bold or even aggressive statements, but as a rule power has a moderating influence and drives them towards the mainstream consensus.

Sometimes there are exceptions. For instance, the Bharatiya Janata Party government of Atal Behari Vajpayee came to power with its election manifesto describing nuclear weapons as a factor of national security. No one paid any attention as this was seen as election rhetoric, but within months of being in office, the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 took everyone by surprise.

The Modi government similarly assumed power advocating a more muscular approach to dealing with recalcitrant neighbours, i.e. principally Pakistan and China. Unfortunately, the Modi government’s experiment with new, coercive doctrines has been erratic and without ensuring that pressure on target nations is calibrated to be neither beyond Indian capabilities nor delinked from universal values, which separate India from China or its protégés.

The reality of China being an all-weather friend of Pakistan has become increasingly apparent as China has chosen to more openly back Pakistan. India too has lifted its engagement with the US, Japan and Australia to a higher plane, treating the Indo-Pacific region as a seamless theatre for diplomatic, economic and military partnerships. The first signs were a more visible Chinese presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, followed by the announcement of the $45 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor. The vetoing of a listing of the leaders of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) by the United Nations Security Council counter-terrorism committee was China directly poking India in the eye despite its own serious problems with terrorism in Xinjiang.

The Indian option was to either, as foreign secretary S. Jaishankar said at the inauguration of Carnegie foundation India, treat this in a UN context and not let it poison the rest of the relationship or to draw a red line and expect China to address it unless it wanted to impact the bilateral relations in other areas. A third alternative was to start paying China in the same coin after weighing the consequences as China tends to pursue its national security goals with dogged firmness.

The controversy that erupted on Monday over the grant and then cancellation of visa to prominent Uyghur leader Dolkun Isa, head of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), for attending the Interethnic/Interfaith Leadership Conference organised by US-based “Initiatives for China” at Dharamsala, raises serious questions. Mr Isa has expressed his disappointment. The government’s explanation that he has an Interpol Red Corner notice, which debars him from entering India, seemed unconvincing. Although India denied a visa to Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer in 2009, as Mr Isa pointed out, India had even as early as 1949 admitted Uyghur leaders fleeing persecution in China. Such conferences need approval of the ministry of external affairs and ministry of home affairs, for which applications are required months in advance, complete with list of invitees. The location and theme was obviously aimed at sending a signal to China. The identity of the sponsors also raises questions about their real masters. Maybe the government felt Mr Isa would take the affront to China too far. The issue that arises is not that visa was denied but that it was withdrawn after grant, making it appear that India buckled under Chinese pressure. It is possible the e-tourist visa was mistakenly given and once its ramifications were clear was withdrawn. However, India should have simply announced that no one can come on a tourist visa to attend a conference, so Mr Isa was being asked to apply correctly. Naturally there was little time to process a fresh visa and the issue would have faded away.

The relations with Pakistan also betray a similar flip-flop that gives an impression of lack of a well thought-out strategy to counter the old conundrum of how to dissuade Pakistan from using terror as an instrument of state policy, which it attempts to use to coerce India to resolve disputes on terms acceptable to Pakistani military, while engaging the civilian government. Mr Modi’s dramatic stopover in Lahore, followed soon by the terror attack at the Pathankot airbase and Pakistani unwillingness to allow, as India did, an Indian investigation team to go to Pakistan leave the relations adrift. The name of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s family in the Panama Papers and his sudden departure for the UK for medical treatment had rumours swirling of another military coup. Mr Sharif having returned to Pakistan leads to the following surmise:

Mr Sharif has been weakened politically, if not fatally; also the Army appears to be not yet ready to directly assume charge of the nation, preferring back-seat driving.

In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s foreign secretary, albeit for a conference on Afghanistan, leaves the possibility of a meeting with his Indian counterpart. Pakistan wants India to operate this second track simultaneously to discuss resolution of disputes instead of, as India insists, having the national security advisers of two countries resolving first the outstanding terror issues, particularly 26/11 and now Pathankot. Pakistan meanwhile has been able to complicate the matter by arresting a former Indian naval officer, perhaps by kidnapping him from Iran where he ran a business, for allegedly abetting terror in Balochistan. Moral equivalence is thus attempted to be created with India. Is this Pakistan’s riposte to the Doval doctrine of an eye for an eye

Clearly the “muscular” national security approach of the Modi government has run into trouble. Meanwhile, the smaller neighbours also test Indian resolve. The President of Maldives breezes into Delhi, signs agreements but goes back and seeks the return of former President Mohamed Nasheed from medical treatment abroad, indicating either that India has withdrawn from Maldivian domestic debate or they are signalling defiance. Henry Kissinger said hope is not a policy. Nor it appears can be muscle flexing which is fitful and not anchored in principles like human rights and democracy and laced with realpolitik.

The writer is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry. He tweets at @ambkcsingh