In diplomacy, let’s get more focused

The Republic of Ireland is a tiny country of about 70,000 sq. km. Most Indians have difficulty distinguishing it from its northern neighbour, Northern Ireland, that is part of the United Kingdom. Yet it is among the world’s 10 richest countries, with a per capita GDP of over $50,000, and the fastest growing European economy. Though its population is under five million, it boasts a diaspora of nearly 80 million, of which around 35 million are in the United States — many with influence in politics and industry. This Irish constituency is so politically important that every year on Ireland’s national day, the US President hosts its Prime Minister at the White House, spending more time with him than with any other world leader on a state visit.

Ireland was a pioneer of call centres, which then moved on to India and elsewhere. Its innovative techniques to attract foreign investment in information technology and high tech inspired a Harvard Business School case study.

Ireland had intimate historical connections with India. A high percentage of British India’s soldiers, civil servants and professionals were Irish; many developed a bond with this country. India’s first geological atlas and its first linguistic atlas were drawn up by Irishmen. Irish missionaries established educational institutions across India; generations of our urban middle class studied in them. There is a groundswell of popular affection for India in Ireland due to these ancestral links. This is magnified by the thousands of Indian doctors and nurses who work in Irish hospitals.

All this is relevant, as this small country with close India connections raised questions on India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) at the recent Seoul meet. Ireland is a friend of India, but it is also one of Europe’s staunchest anti-nuclear countries; it was closely involved in drafting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

An earlier case of disappointment for India in the NSG was its 2011 decision to ban transfers of fuel enrichment and re-processing technology (ENR) to non-NPT nations. India felt it betrayed the promise of “full civil nuclear cooperation” in the India-US joint statement of July 2005. India was unable to find even one friend in the NSG to block the consensus.

These cases show the kind of challenges that Indian diplomacy faces in securing support for our interests in multilateral forums. In his brief spell in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has crisscrossed the globe with the avowed aim of building partnerships to secure wider participation in the India story, thus promoting its growth and development. A strong subtext of his proactive foreign policy (arguably more recognised abroad than at home) is that bilateral links and plurilateral coalitions expand India’s global footprint and enhance its influence in multilateral forums.

The PM creates openings; his government has to exploit them. That today may be the weakest link in our foreign policy — the inadequate permeation of our foreign policy strategy into our systems, preventing coordinated action.

The obvious cooperation possibilities with Ireland were re-emphasised when Mr Modi visited it last September. An agreement in higher education was envisaged, that would facilitate student and research exchanges. Irish universities are of good quality; work permit regulations are relatively liberal. It would therefore benefit Indian students facing uncertain prospects in the UK. Yet this agreement got stuck somewhere in our system, which did not comprehend the context. Irish vocational training institutes wishing to participate in our skill development programme didn’t find much response, despite their quality and our need. Ireland’s low corporate tax, financial infrastructure and English-language base makes it an attractive EU base for Indian corporates leaving the “Brexited” UK. Technology collaborations hold promise; stakeholders have to be nudged in this direction with relevant information.

A vibrant economic partnership, reinforcing the existing popular goodwill, would give a stronger incentive for Ireland to accommodate our important interests, while we find a satisfactory way of responding to its concerns.

Similarly, there is much India could have done to prevent or dilute the 2011 NSG guideline change. After the India-US nuclear deal in 2008, India expected collaborations with the US and France for at least 20,000 MW of nuclear power. It promised to establish a nuclear liability regime conforming to international standards. However, after a chaotic domestic debate, where misinformation triumphed over fact, India enacted a liability law inconsistent with international practices. Indian and foreign nuclear equipment suppliers felt it exposed them to open-ended liability risk. This effectively stalled nuclear collaboration with the US and France and put in doubt new Russian projects in Kudankulam.

If our government had engaged more effectively with both domestic and foreign stakeholders, it could have crafted a liability law that met domestic concerns as well as the nuclear industry’s expectations. We could have avoided a decade’s delay in expanding our nuclear power capacity. Also, with orders of billions of dollars in nuclear equipment from the US, France and Russia in the pipeline, India would have been in a powerful position to influence the NSG decision on ENR transfers.

These are just two illustrations of the reality that for India to achieve its foreign policy ambitions, there has to be a wider understanding of these ambitions in our decision-making system. Exploiting economic opportunities abroad needs coordination between government departments, financial institutions and corporate circles. It should be recognised that virtually every relationship (even with a small country) can be mutually beneficial, each bilateral relationship reinforces our global presence and influences the way other nations deal with us. There must be a better understanding of how domestic decisions impact our international relations.

The assessments of Mr Modi’s foreign policy have quite rightly identified implementation as the critical factor for its success. Implementation shortfalls are often attributed to the “narrow bandwidth” of the external affairs ministry and its manpower constraints. The real problem, however, is not of MEA’s bandwidth, but of a common foreign policy wavelength in the government.

While diplomacy is the MEA’s principal responsibility (though we also have many crypto-diplomats elsewhere), an effective foreign policy is a government-wide enterprise: in conception, articulation and execution.

The writer is a former diplomat