Despite attack in Pampore, lessons yet to be learnt

In the last seven months, the 35-km stretch between Bijbehera and Pampore has seen over six attacks on the security forces by the militants. It is a classic ambush territory/stretch — villages with a sizeable population of overground workers or sympathisers teem alongside the narrow stretch of the slow moving road. These unarmed overground workers are priceless in aiding and facilitating the “shoot & scoot” tactics of the armed militants by melting into the crowded villages of overground workers, provoking the forces into potential retaliation in the civilian areas with the prospects of counter-productive civilian casualties. The latest attack in Pampore followed the same pattern, with the deadly effect of eight CRPF jawans making the supreme sacrifice.

Successful counter-insurgency is the art of integrating political, military, economic, psychological and civic actions in a seamless choreographed manner. Earlier successes in tackling insurgencies in Mizoram and Punjab involved hitting the sweet-spot of various governmental levers. In Kashmir, the governmental agencies and policy frameworks operate in silos.

Even within the security calculus, the immediate aftermath of Pampore exposed the operational un-integration and the latent bad blood between the Army and the Central armed police forces (in this case, CRPF). While the Army reports to the defence ministry, the BSF, CRPF, SSB and others report to the home ministry.

So when defence minister Manohar Parrikar remarked “doubt if the standard operating procedure was followed properly”, it was soon dismissed by the CRPF DG who said all laid-down procedures were “absolutely” adhered to by its personnel.

While the exact lacunas and corrective SOPs are yet to be fleshed out, the problem is a critical, institutional misalignment of multiple security forces.

Common sense dictates that given the principal role played by the Army (in terms of scope, scale and capabilities — as also of taking on the additional “policing” tasks like “road opening party”), the Northern Army Commander ought to be the singular head of a centralised operational taskforce with multi-dimensional forces and agencies.

The current structure of “unified headquarters” at Srinagar is a please-all structure for the top brass that does not force the singularity of objective, SOPs and operational actions. The top field commanders of the Army are necessarily insurgency-hardened veterans, who perforce have done the requisite tenures and combat exposures in insurgency zones that is not comparable by the IPS-heavy top brass of the Central police forces.

The soldiers and organisation-bred command-level officers of the police forces are comparable and acquit themselves admirably on the field, as in the case of the Pampore incident where head constable Vir Singh and constable Satish Chand fired back 39 and 32 rounds respectively, before going down fighting.

Sadly, even basic requirements like bullet-proof vests and transportation vehicles are inadequate to minimise casualties. Even after Pampore, the security lessons are doomed to remain unlearnt. The confusion on analysing the root causes and remedial measures of the security angle will have multiple stakeholders and opinions, outside of the security fraternity.

Importantly, Pampore-like incidents are a manifestation of the political, economic and social frustrations that are beyond the scope of the security forces. In a participative democracy like ours, the security forces can only contain the insurgents and violence to a manageable level (it is humanely impossible to have zero infiltration on any border of this size, terrain and conditions).

The societal structures fomenting the ongoing angst, mistrust and prejudices require political and civic inputs, as was done in the case of both Punjab and Mizoram. In the Valley, the security forces are ploughing a lonely furrow with diminishing returns. The swelling of crowds at militant funerals and the obvious hardening of local perceptions suggest a worrisome trend in the Valley. Clearly, the conflict of the “mind and heart” persists and the political co-option and integration of the misguided elements has yet to fructify.

Endemic corruption and administrative laxity has accounted for umpteen “packages” (Rs 80,000 crores was announced last year by the Prime Minister) that have resulted in no perceptible empathy, socio-economic or infrastructural upliftment of the Valley.

Lashkar-e-Tayyaba chief Hafiz Saeed’s son-in-law Khalid Waleed, had reportedly plotted the Pampore attack, with the ready assistance of local handlers for logistical support. The youth are increasingly ceding ground to fundamentalist and radical entities. This dangerous security environment has to be contextualised with the oft-conflicting voices between the political and security classes — removal of AFSPA, minimal presence of the security apparatus, etc.

It is a difficult balance to maintain between security imperatives and minimal disturbance and interference via checking and frisking. The nature of conflict is asymmetric, complex and the solution lies in a holistic and decidedly integrated approach — neither of which is visible today. Tactical success in terms of electoral success by politicians, number of militants neutralised by the security forces, quantum of civic spends by the administrators takes precedence over real strategic progress. The writer is a retired lieutenant- general and a former lieutenant-governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry